Showing posts with label Community trade mark. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Community trade mark. Show all posts

Current Intelligence - Showdown! General Court annuls the annulment of the ‘Winnetou’ trade mark

In our latest issue, Editorial Board member Birgit Clark (Baker & McKenzie LLP) discusses the judgment of the General Court in Case T-501/13 Karl-May-Verlag v OHIM. The dispute concerned the registrability of the word sign "WINNETOU" (a fictional character created by the renown German writer Karl May) as a Community trade mark (now EUTM). 


Showdown! - General Court annuls the annulment of the ‘Winnetou’ trade mark


Birgit Clark
Baker & McKenzie LLP
Email: birgit.clark@bakermckenzie.com
General Court of the European Union, Karl-May-Verlag v OHIM (WINNETOU), T-501/13, 18 March 2016

The General Court of the European Union upheld an appeal by publishing house Karl-May-Verlag GmbH against the EU Intellectual Property Office’s decision, then called OHIM, to annul the former’s Community trade mark WINNETOU, confirming that the Office should not have granted the application for a declaration of invalidity brought by Constantin Film Produktion GmbH without assessing, independently, whether the sign Winnetou was descriptive for the goods and services covered. 
Legal context 
Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (Regulation) lists absolute grounds for refusal of registration and, inter alia, provides that:[the] following shall not be registered: (…)(b) trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character;(c) trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service. 
Article 52 Regulation provides that the trade mark ‘shall be declared invalid on application to the Office or on the basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings where tit has been registered contrary to the provisions of Article 7 [Regulation]’. Article 75 Regulation stipulates that ‘[d]ecisions of the Office shall state the reasons on which they are based. They shall be based only on reasons or evidence on which the parties concerned have had on opportunity to present their comments’. 
Facts 
Karl May (25 February 1842–30 March 1912) was a German writer best known for his adventure novels set in the American Old West. Many of May’s works have enjoyed enduring popularity in Germany and beyond and have been adapted for film and stage. One of May’s most famous protagonists is the fictional character Winnetou, who over the last two decades has been the subject of numerous copyright, trade mark and work title disputes, mostly in German courts. 
In 2003 German company Karl-May-Verlag GmbH registered the sign WINNETOU as a Community trade mark for various goods and services in Classes 3, 9, 14, 16, 18, 21, 24, 25, 28–30, 39 and 41–3. In 2010 film production company Constantin Film Produktion GmbH brought an application for a declaration of invalidity against the trade mark, arguing that the sign was both descriptive and non-distinctive for the broad specification covered. Constantin Film Produktion GmbH requested that registration should thus be declared invalid in its entirety on the basis of Articles 7 and 52(1)(a) CTMR. 
While OHIM’s Cancellation Division rejected the application for a declaration of invalidity, the Board of Appeal (‘Board’) took a different view and annulled the contested trade mark as being descriptive and non-distinctive for all goods and services covered, except for ‘printers’ type’ and ‘printing blocks’ in Class 16. 
On the question of ‘descriptiveness’, the Board found that Winnetou was a major character in a series of novels by the late German author Karl May and one of the main protagonists films and plays. Therefore, the relevant German consumer would understand the sign Winnetou as reference to this particular fictional Native American character. Notably, the Board based its argument on several earlier decisions by German national courts, including a widely reported decision by the German Federal Court of Justice (I ZB 19/00 of 2002), concerning the same mark. 
The Board followed the German courts’ assessment that in the context of goods and services such as films, printed matter, photographs, entertainment services and exploitation of industrial property rights, the sign Winnetou was descriptive since the relevant consumer would associate them with the character Winnetou. The remaining goods and services—with the narrow exception of ‘printers’ type’ and ‘printing blocks’ in Class 16—could all be categorized as ‘merchandising’ which would equally be associated with the fictional character Winnetou. 
Analysis 
On further appeal by Karl-May-Verlag GmbH the General Court annulled the Board of Appeal’s decision, focusing on two main reasons: firstly, the Board had infringed the principles of autonomy of the Community trade mark system and, secondly, the Board had failed to properly reason its decision with regard to the consumer perception of the sign and the categories of goods and services covered. 
Weight of the German courts’ decisions 
The General Court took the view that, by treating decisions of German courts as binding, the Board had infringed the principles of autonomy and independence which govern the Community trade marks system. Notably, instead of assessing—independently and afresh—whether the sign ‘Winnetou’ was descriptive for the goods and services covered, the Board treated the earlier decisions by various German courts, which had deemed the sign as descriptive, as binding and also based its finding of the sign’s lack of distinctive character on the assessment of the German courts. 
The Office had argued that it had taken the German case law into account because it dealt with the same mark, came from a higher national court, related to partly identical goods and services and had been handed down shortly after the contested mark was filed. It also stressed that the Board’s decision did not rely on just one earlier judgment, but four German court decisions, and thereby demonstrated that there was settled case law. 
The General Court disagreed and found that it was clear that the Board had treated the German court decisions not only as possessing an indicative value and thus as evidence in the context of the assessment of the facts of the case, but as binding precedents with regard to the registrability of the Winnetou trade mark registration. The judges explained (at para 45) that ‘[in] the present case, the Board of Appeal is not criticised for taking into consideration the decisions of the German courts, but for having taken the view that it was bound by those decisions, which is contrary to the case-law cited … and is not called into question by OHIM’s argument’. 
Insufficient reasoning by the Board 
Secondly, the General Court held that the Board had failed to give sufficient reasons for the perception of the sign beyond its concrete meaning as an evocation of a fictional character. Particularly, the Board had failed to ‘carry out any specific analysis to establish that the sign WINNETOU, beyond its concrete meaning as an evocation of a fictional character, was perceived by the relevant public as referring to the concepts of “Native American” and “Native American Chieftain”.’ Consequently, the contested decision was inadequately reasoned with regard to the perception of the sign. 
Further, the court rejected the Office’s argument that the general public regarded ‘Winnetou’ films, books or theatre representations as books or films about Native Americans, so that the sign WINNETOU would be perceived as linked more generally to the theme of ‘Native American’ and ‘Native American Chieftain’. The judges explained with reference to the court’s precedent CFCMCEE v OHIM (T-405/07 and T-406/07, ECR, EU:T:2009:164, para 69) that even if proved, this could not mitigate the lack of reasoning in the contested decision since the Office ‘is not allowed, in the course of the proceedings, to advance supplementary reasons for a decision vitiated by a defective statement of reasons under Article 296 TFEU’. 
Regarding the relationship between the contested mark and the specification covered, the judges found that the Board’s reasoning in relation to the descriptive character of the sign concerning a large variety of goods (including perfumery, jewellery, stationery, textiles and meats) which the Board had broadly grouped together under the heading ‘merchandising’ goods, was ‘excessively general and abstract’ and lacked a ‘specific analysis’ of their respective nature and characteristics. The Board had held that for these ‘merchandising’ goods, the sign Winnetou indicated that the goods were connected to the Winnetou films or the book character whereby consumers would assume that they are ‘Winnetou’ advertising goods but would not regard the sign as an indicator of trade origin. In this context the court referred to its precedent in Zuffa LLC v OHIM (T-118/06) and found that these goods did not constitute a homogeneous category, since they there was no sufficiently direct and specific link between them. Consequently, the reasoning of the Board’s decision did not meet the requirements of Article 75 CTMR, since it did not enable the court to conduct an effective review of the contested decision. 
Practical significance 
Since the court has annulled the Board’s decision, the Office must now reassess the application for a declaration of invalidity brought by Constantin Film Produktion GmbH, taking into account the grounds of the court’s judgment. 
While this decision saves the Winnetou trade mark for the time being and serves as a reminder to the Office to follow the mantra of always assessing all evidence afresh, this does not at the same time mean that Karl-May-Verlag GmbH will be able to prevent third parties from producing mere reprints of Karl May’s classic Winnetou novels since May’s works have been in the public domain since 1963. Nevertheless, the German Federal Court of Justice decided in 2003 (I ZR 171/00 of 23 January 2003 ‘Winnetous Rückkehr’) that so called ‘work title protection’ under Article 15 German Trade Mark Act will continue even where the copyright in a work has already expired. In order to avert an extension of copyright protection via trade mark laws, however, neither trade mark, nor work title protection should allow Karl-May-Verlag GmbH to prevent third-party reprints of the Winnetou novels, bearing in mind that the title of a novel is meant to distinguish the works but will not be seen as an indication of trade origin in the trade mark sense. This notwithstanding, the Karl-May-Verlag GmbH publishing house should—according to another recent court decision by the Regional Court Nürnberg-Fürth (HK O 1164/15 of 23 December 2015)—be able prevent film adaptations of the original Winnetou works in cases where these substantially change the protagonist’s life story when compared to the original storyline(s). 
In light of this flurry of case law and conflicting IP rights, it appears safe to say that whatever the Office will now decide in the Winnetou trade mark case, there is a good chance that Winnetou will be at the centre of further court cases and interested parties are well advised to plan carefully before making further adaptations of the noble chieftain’s life.
© The Author(s) (2016). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

A second bite of the apple leaves a sour taste

Authors: Maeve Lynch and John Colbourn (Redd Solicitors LLP, London, UK)

Apple and Pear Australia Ltd., Star Fruits Diffusion v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Carolus C. BVBA, General Court (Fourth Chamber), Case T-378/13, EU:T:2015:186, 25 March 2015

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2015) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpv112, first published online: July 9, 2015

The General Court has decided that, in the context of opposition proceedings, although the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market has a duty to consider the decisions of Community trade mark courts in parallel infringement proceedings concerning the same parties and the same marks, it is not bound to follow them.

Legal context

Council Regulation 207/2009 on the Community trade mark (CTM) stipulates which decision-making bodies have jurisdiction to decide various matters relating to CTMs. In particular, Article 96 of the Regulation provides that CTM courts are to have exclusive jurisdiction for, inter alia, infringement actions and counterclaims for revocation of CTMs. However, under the Regulation, the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon applications for registration of a CTM. Consequently, it is possible for opposition and infringement proceedings to proceed in parallel even though they concern the same parties and the same marks.

Facts

Carolus, a Belgian tree nursery specializing in apple trees, applied in October 2009 to register the word mark ENGLISH PINK as a CTM for goods in class 31, including agricultural products and fresh fruits. An application for an identical Benelux mark, filed by Carolus on the same date, was subsequently granted.

Apple and Pear Australia Ltd. and Star Fruits Diffusion (the opponents) used PINK LADY in connection with the sale of a particular variety of apple, called Cripps Pink. In April 2010, the opponents opposed Carolus' application to register ENGLISH PINK as a CTM on the basis of three earlier CTMs which were registered for goods that were largely identical to the goods for which ENGLISH PINK was proposed to be registered. These CTMs were:
The word PINK LADY; 
Two separate figurative marks featuring the words ‘Pink Lady’ (shown below).
Shortly thereafter, in June 2010, the opponents commenced infringement and revocation proceedings against Carolus before the Tribunal de commerce de Bruxelles (the ‘Brussels Commercial Court’). Two years later the Brussels Commercial Court delivered its judgment. As regards the strength of the opponents' mark, the court took the view that PINK LADY was not descriptive since apples are not pink and, on the basis of evidence adduced by the opponents and common knowledge, PINK LADY had a substantial reputation. Holding that; there was a likelihood of confusion between ENGLISH PINK and PINK LADY, it ordered Carolus to refrain from infringing the opponents' CTMs throughout the European Union and invalidated Carolus' Benelux ENGLISH PINK mark.


Following this decision, the opponents wrote to OHIM a number of times to draw its attention to the ruling of the Brussels Commercial Court and in August 2012, the opponents informed OHIM that Carolus had acquiesced in the judgment, which was therefore final.

However, in May 2013, the Fourth Board of Appeal rejected the opposition. Surprisingly, the Board of Appeal made no mention of the decision of the Brussels Commercial Court, despite having been made aware of it on a number of occasions. Further, its analysis of the likelihood of confusion between the two marks was very different from that of the Brussels Commercial Court. For example, the Board of Appeal observed that the ‘pink’ element of PINK LADY was non-distinctive because apples ‘may oscillate into shades of pink’ and it took the view that the opponents had not adduced sufficient evidence in support of their argument that PINK LADY had a reputation.

The opponents appealed to the General Court on the basis that the Board of Appeal should have considered the decision of the Brussels Commercial Court and delivered a ruling that was compatible with that decision.

Analysis

Should the Board of Appeal have taken the Brussels decision into account?

The General Court noted that the decision of the Brussels Commercial Court was, prima facie, ‘a relevant factual element for resolving the case at hand’ and added that The Board of Appeal could not fail to recognise that there were essential common points between the factual aspects at issue in the infringement proceedings initiated and the opposition proceedings brought to contest the registration of the mark sought. Not only were the parties to both sets of proceedings identical, but also the earlier word mark relied on in support of the infringement proceedings before the Brussels Commercial Court was the same as the one relied on in support of the opposition proceedings before the various departments of OHIM. Moreover, the Benelux mark ENGLISH PINK, annulment of which was ordered by that court, and the mark sought were highly similar.

It was also relevant that the decision had been made by a CTM court established under the Regulation and that the Regulation was intended to guarantee uniform protection of CTMs throughout the European Union.

Accordingly, the General Court held that the Board of Appeal should have assessed the impact of the Brussels Commercial Court's decision in the present case. Further, the Board of Appeal had infringed Article 75 of the Regulation for failing to state reasons for the inferences to be drawn from that decision. The General Court held that these failures constituted grounds for annulment of the Board of Appeal's decision.

Res judicata

The General Court also considered whether, under the principle of res judicata, the Board of Appeal was bound by the decision of the Brussels Commercial Court. In this respect, the General Court made the following points:

  • Board of Appeal decisions must be assessed solely on the basis of the Regulation and not on the basis of earlier judicial decisions; 

  • While the Regulation does explicitly deal with the application of res judicata in some specific scenarios, the Regulation does not contain any provision by which OHIM is bound by a decision of a CTM court delivered in an action for infringement when it exercises its exclusive jurisdiction over the registration of CTMs in the context of CTM opposition proceedings; 

  • The requirement of unitary character of the CTM does not mean that res judicata applied to the situation in question; 

  • The subject matter and causes of action of the proceedings were different. The action for infringement before the Brussels Commercial Court concerned the validity of the Benelux mark ENGLISH PINK (under Benelux law) and a request for a pan-European injunction on the basis of the opponents' CTMs (under Articles 9(1)(b) and 9(1)(c) of the Regulation). However, the proceedings before OHIM concerned opposition to the registration of ENGLISH PINK as a CTM (under Articles 8(1)(b) and 8(5) of the Regulation); and 

  • Carolus' Benelux mark and the CTM it applied for were two legally distinct marks. The judgment of the Brussels Commercial Court had the effect of protecting the opponents' earlier word mark only against the effects of the Benelux mark ENGLISH PINK.
For these reasons, the General Court held that the principle of res judicata did not attach to the judgment of the Brussels Commercial Court in the context of the OHIM opposition proceedings.

Practical significance

This decision is unsatisfactory for brand owners who rely on an earlier CTM in order to prevent a third party from using and registering as a CTM a later identical or similar sign. The Board of Appeal's decision illustrates how it is possible for a trade mark proprietor to enforce its CTM and obtain from a CTM court a pan-European injunction against a third party infringer but leaves that same proprietor powerless if OHIM does not consider itself bound by that decision and proceeds to register as a CTM the ‘infringing’ sign. The relevant infringer is left with a registered CTM which it cannot use and which presumably will be vulnerable to revocation after a period of five years of non-use due to the effect of the injunction.

The one positive aspect of this decision is that OHIM has at least a duty to consider and set out the inferences that it draws from such decisions of CTM courts. However, this case constitutes an excellent example of how OHIM and national courts can take very different approaches to the same factual circumstances and essentially the same legal tests that apply to infringement and opposition scenarios. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that parties to parallel infringement and opposition proceedings will not be subject to similar conflicting decisions in the future.

The EU General Court provides guidance on own name, unfair advantage and late evidence in trade mark proceedings

Author: Kirsten Toft (Virtuoso Legal, Leeds, UK)

Kenzo Tsujimoto v OHIM, Case T-393/12, 22 January 2015 (unreported)

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2015) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpv085, first published online: May 15, 2015

Upholding a decision of OHIM's Board of Appeal, the EU General Court has found that Mr Tsujimoto's wish to register his first name, Kenzo, as a Community trade mark (CTM) was ‘without due cause’ and therefore took unfair advantage of the eponymous mark of luxury fashion brand Kenzo within the meaning of Article 8(5) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation 207/2009.

Legal context

Kenzo Tsujimoto, owner of US-based Napa Valley winery Kenzo Estate (makers of, among others, the Asatsuyu Sauvignon Blanc), applied in November 2009 to register the word mark KENZO as a Community trade mark (CTM) for ‘Wine; alcoholic beverages of fruit; western liquors (in general)’ in class 33. In June 2010, luxury French fashion brand Kenzo, founded by the notable Japanese designer Kenzo Takada and owned by the LVMH luxury fashion conglomerate, opposed the application on the basis of Article 8(5) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation 207/2009 (‘the Regulation’), citing its earlier Community word mark KENZO covering cosmetics in class 3, leather goods in class 18 and clothing in class 25.

The Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market's (OHIM's) Opposition Division rejected the opposition, but that decision was reversed by the Second Board of Appeal. Mr Tsujimoto appealed to the General Court.

Facts

Mr Tsujimoto argued that, in failing to address his argument concerning his wish to use his forename, Kenzo, for a certain range of goods, the Board of Appeal had breached its duty to provide a statement of reasons under Article 75 of the Regulation. The General Court disagreed. Although Article 75 required OHIM to state reasons on which its decisions were based, there was no obligation ‘to take a position on all the arguments relied on by the parties before them’, and presenting ‘the facts and legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision’ was sufficient (see Matratzen Concord v OHIM—Barranco Schnitzler, T-351/08, ECLI:EU:T:2010:263). Accordingly, the Board of Appeal's response that ‘no due cause [had] been demonstrated’, albeit short, was nevertheless adequate.

Observing that the Regulation did not confer an unconditional right to register a forename or a surname (see Prinz von Hannover v OHIM, T-397/09, ECLI:EU:T:2011:246), the court concluded that there was no due cause under Article 8(5) based on the fact that Mr Tsujimoto's first name was Kenzo.

Mr Tsujimoto also argued that the Board of Appeal had infringed Article 76(2) of the Regulation by considering evidence produced by Kenzo after 18 May 2012, the Opposition Division's deadline. Once again the General Court disagreed. The court stated that Article 76(2) had to be read in the light of Rule 50(1) of the Implementing Regulation (2868/95) and not, as Mr Tsujimoto contended, Rule 20(1). Following Rintisch (C-120/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:638), the court clarified that the third subparagraph of Rule 50(1) expressly provided that, when examining an appeal of an Opposition Division decision, the Board of Appeal enjoyed the discretion conferred under Article 76(2) to decide whether it was appropriate to consider ‘additional or supplementary facts and evidence not submitted within the periods prescribed or specified by the Opposition Division’. The court also clarified that, as in Rintisch, when OHIM adjudicated in the context of opposition proceedings, accepting late factual or evidentiary submissions was likely to be justified where OHIM considered, first, that the late submission was, on the face of it, ‘genuinely relevant to the outcome’ and, secondly, that ‘the stage of the proceedings at which that late submission takes place and the circumstances surrounding it do not argue against such matters from being taken into account’.

In the court's view, Kenzo's late evidence was genuinely relevant. The court observed that the Board of Appeal had found that this evidence, even though it was submitted by Kenzo primarily to establish use of its earlier mark, provided supplementary evidence of that mark's reputation as use of a trade mark is a relevant factor in assessing reputation, and also confirmed the evidence on reputation submitted by Kenzo before the deadline. The court also found that, among other things, the evidence in question had been submitted before the Opposition Division reached its decision and before proceedings were begun in the Board of Appeal, meaning that the evidence was not submitted at a late stage in the proceedings as Mr Tsujimoto contended. All in all, the Board of Appeal had not infringed Article 76(2) by taking into account the evidence submitted after the deadline.

As regards Article 8(5), the court found that, first, Kenzo's earlier trade mark had a reputation based on Kenzo's evidence submitted before and, as just held, after the deadline. In particular, the evidence submitted ahead of the deadline included 400 pages on Kenzo's global advertising campaigns for its mark, covering several EU States, between 2000 and 2010, and a monograph on Kenzo Takada which, as Kenzo pointed out, was in the same series of monographs dedicated to other legendary fashion figures such as Chanel, Versace and Valentino.

Secondly, contrary to Mr Tsujimoto's view, there was a risk of an unfair advantage. Both of the marks were identical, and the earlier trade mark was inherently distinctive and had a substantial reputation. The court stated that the Board had correctly inferred that, since Kenzo's goods were at ‘the high end of the market’ for a consumer with ‘more sophisticated taste than the average consumer’ and the mark applied for by Mr Tsujimoto ‘included high-quality wines and cognac intended for equally sophisticated consumers’, a link between those goods could be established since they all ‘projected images of luxury, glamour, good taste, and social status’. Moreover, Kenzo's earlier trade mark, as the Board of Appeal found, had ‘undisputable allure’ which could readily be transferable to other luxury goods including cognac, champagne or wine. Finally, as established earlier, there was no due cause. For these reasons, the General Court dismissed Mr Tsujimoto's appeal.

Analysis

As far as the General Court is concerned, there is only room for one Kenzo in the luxury brand market. EU trade mark law does provide an ‘own name’ defence to infringement (see Article 12 of the Regulation) but, as the General Court pointed out, there is no unconditional right to register one's own name as a CTM pursuant to the Regulation.

Practical significance

The practical issue for Mr Tsujimoto is whether this decision affects his ability to trade in the EU at all under the ‘Kenzo’ name, assuming that his plan is to extend distribution of his, by all accounts, very expensive Californian wine. In Reed Executive plc v Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 159, Jacob LJ referred to Gerolsteiner Brunnen v Putsch (C-100/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:11) in concluding that a man may use his own name even if there is some actual confusion with a registered trade mark, albeit that the amount of confusion which could be tolerated was a question of degree. Gerolsteiner, a much criticised decision on honest use, may not help Mr Tsujimoto when it comes to Article 8(5) and unfair advantage, however, particularly as the General Court here acknowledged that Kenzo's ‘undisputable allure’ could readily be transferable to wine.

Following Rintisch v OHIM, this case also provides useful guidance on the admissibility of late evidence in the context of OHIM opposition proceedings.

How to justify decisions while rejecting evidence

Author: Tomasz Rychlicki (Patent and Trade Mark Attorney, Poland)

CEDC International sp z oo v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market, Case T-235/12, ECLI:EU:T:2014:1058, General Court of the European Union, 11 December 2014

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2015) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpv081, first published online: May 5, 2015

The General Court has clarified rules on the basis of which the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) may reject material evidence supplied by the proceedings party after the expiry of the prescribed time-limit.

Legal context

Articles 75, 76(1) and 76(2) of Council Regulation 207/2009 on the Community trade mark (CTMR) provide that decisions of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) must state the reasons on which they are based. In proceedings before OHIM, the Office examines the facts of its own motion; however, in proceedings relating to relative grounds for refusal of registration, OHIM is restricted in this examination to the facts, evidence and arguments provided by the parties and the relief sought. The Office may disregard facts or evidence which are not submitted in due time by the parties concerned.

Facts

Underberg AG applied to register a three dimensional CTM in class 33 for goods such as spirits and liquors. The sign was described as a greenish-brown blade of grass in a bottle, the length of the blade of grass being approximately three-quarters of the height of the bottle.

The Polish company Przedsiębiorstwo Polmos Białystok (Spółka Akcyjna), which was replaced by the applicant, CEDC International sp z oo, following a merger by acquisition in 2011, opposed. Polmos Białystok based its opposition, inter alia, on an earlier three-dimensional French mark registered for goods in class 33 such as alcoholic beverages. The French trade mark was described as a bottle inside which a blade of grass was placed almost diagonally. The opponent also relied on other national registrations valid in Germany, Poland, Japan and France and different unregistered signs claimed in various Member States of the EU.

The opposition was fully dismissed by the OHIM. According to the Office, the evidence was insufficient in order to establish genuine use of the earlier three-dimensional French mark and that the mark in which it was registered was transformed by the existence of the word ‘żubrówka’ on the label as well as by the portrayal of a bison on its marketed bottles.

CEDC appealed against the decision of the Opposition Division and, two months later, it lodged its statement setting out the grounds of the appeal, appended to which was evidence of use which had not been adduced before the Opposition Division.

The OHIM Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety. CEDC brought an action before the General Court claiming, inter alia, infringement of Articles 75 and 76(1) of the CTMR.

Analysis

The Polish company argued that OHIM did not examine certain facts and failed to point out the grounds for such action, in that it did not take into consideration representations of the product from different perspectives presented by the trade mark applicant. Further, a variety of press articles and messages published on websites which showed the blade of grass in a bottle were disregarded by OHIM as being evidence that French consumers regarded the blade of grass as a distinctive feature which related to the nature of use of the mark. CEDC argued that the Board of Appeal did not criticize the admissibility of the evidence appended, but failed to provide the reasons for its assessment of the admissibility of that evidence. As OHIM did not do so, no criticism as to the admissibility of the evidence had been made. CEDC argued that, since the Board of Appeal neither rejected the evidence nor denied its probative value, it was obliged to take it into account and examine it. Failure to do so constituted an infringement of Articles 75, 76(1) and 76(2).

The plea was ruled lawful by the General Court in that the Board of Appeal did not exercise its discretion with an objective way to conclude whether any evidence in addition to that provided for the first time after the time-limit set by the Opposition Division was required. The court noted that, if the Board of Appeal did not exercise its discretion, it could not have stated that the evidence was admissible.

The court also ruled that OHIM was incorrect in replying that, because the Board of Appeal did not include that new evidence in its assessment of the nature of use that must be construed as meaning that it decided not to take it into account. In fact, as the Board of Appeal did not exercise its discretion, it could not have made an implicit finding that that evidence was admissible. Even if it could be considered that OHIM did exercise its discretion as to whether or not to allow the evidence, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, where OHIM exercises its discretion to decide whether to take into account a document that has been submitted out of time, it must give reasons for its decision on the matter. Further, using the term ‘among others’ could not be treated as an objective exercise of such discretion when used for dismissing that evidence.

The court annulled the challenged decision and remitted the appeal to OHIM in order to judge if any evidence in addition to that provided by the applicant for the first time should be considered so that a decision could be made, in view of the guidance from the case law and the present judgment, as well as taking into account circumstances and presenting reason for the decision.

Practical significance

The conclusions presented in this judgment will undoubtedly contribute to increased legal certainty and sound administration in the case of a decision issued by OHIM, in particular through the obligation to justify its decisions in the context of all the evidence presented by the party to opposition proceedings.

OHIM Board of Appeal's broad discretion is still subject to general legal principles of judicial review

Author: Niamh Hall (FRKelly, Dublin & Belfast)

Royalton Overseas v OHIM–S.C. Romarose Invest (KAISERHOFF), Case T-556/12

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2015) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpv050, first published online: March 22, 2015

Does the annulment of the OHIM Board of Appeal decision in Royalton/KAISERHOFF on suspension requests herald a new standard for procedural matters in appeals? The General Court has issued its first ruling annulling a substantive decision of the OHIM Board of Appeal on the basis of a manifest error of assessment. The particular issue concerned the Board's broad discretion in the procedural matter of refusing a suspension request.

Legal context

It is well recognized that the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) Board of Appeal has a broad discretion in many matters. For example, it is not bound by the same rules of practices on extensions and suspensions as the Opposition and Cancellation Divisions. Although this discretion in terms of suspensions has previously been challenged before the General Court, the actions of the Board of Appeal have to date been vindicated. In Case T-145/08 Atlas Transport GmbH v OHIM (para 70), it was established that the broad discretion of the Boards to suspend proceedings can be judicially reviewed only on the accepted administrative law principles of manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers. In that case, no manifest error or misuse of powers was identified. The present case, in holding that there was a manifest error of assessment, engaged in an informative examination of the principles that apply to such errors. It is also the first time that manifest error has been successfully argued in a substantive decision. The only previous occasion on which an appeal on manifest error was successful involved the award of costs in Case T-32/04 Lyco-A.

Facts

The applicant Royalton Overseas Ltd filed an application for a figurative Community trade mark for the KAISERHOFF logo for goods in classes 8 and 21. This application was opposed by S C Romarose Invest Srl on the basis of an earlier Romanian registration for KAISERHOFF for goods and services in classes 11, 21 and 35. The opposition was partially upheld and Royalton appealed.

In its statement of grounds and in additional observations filed afterwards, Royalton requested that the proceedings be suspended on the basis that a cancellation action filed by Royalton against the opponent's earlier registration was pending before the Bucharest Municipal Court, Romania. The Board of Appeal did not suspend the proceedings and instead issued a decision upholding the Opposition Division decision and dismissing the appeal.

The Board of Appeal's decision on the suspension issue was based on two main points:
The cancellation action could not be taken into account as it was brought after the appeal was filed and the statement of grounds was submitted.

The Board had serious doubts about the true intentions of the applicant in requesting suspension of the proceedings, especially as the applicant had filed other cancellation actions against the opponent's registration in the past which had been concluded.
The Board of Appeal also rejected the applicant's arguments that the registration certificate filed in respect of the opponent's registration was incorrect as it did not reflect limitations on the goods resulting from a third party opposition. It held that no copy of the original decision limiting the opponent's registration had been provided but, even if it had been provided, the outcome would not have been different in the light of the high degree of similarity of the marks. The General Court refused to admit additional documents provided for the first time before it confirmed the limitation to the opponent's registration, and this issue was not explored further.

In regard to the cancellation action against the opponent's earlier registration in Romania, the applicant filed a further certificate of the Romanian court, confirming the existence of that action, and the opponent filed evidence of two previous cancellation actions filed against that registration by the applicant. The court also refused to admit these additional documents provided for the first time to the court, in line with the decision on new evidence in ARTHUR ET FELICIE (Case T-346/04).

The Board of Appeal also alleged that no copy of the original cancellation action had been provided and that the English translation provided did not show that the opponent's earlier registration was currently the subject of the cancellation action. OHIM, before the court, accepted that a copy of the original action had indeed been provided along with the translation and that the documents filed identified the opponent's earlier registration as the subject. However, OHIM maintained that the Board of Appeal was correct to be uncertain whether this was a delaying tactic in view of the two earlier cancellation actions taken by the applicant. The court held that Article 76(1) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation (CTMR) requires that OHIM examines carefully and impartially all of the factual and legal aspects of the case (in line with Case T-427/11 BIODERMA) and that the Board of Appeal had failed in this duty of diligence by omitting to consider the evidence of the cancellation action which was before it. The court then considered whether the Board of Appeal could still validly refuse the request for suspension, notwithstanding the existence of the cancellation action.

The court confirmed that the Board of Appeal has a broad discretion as to whether to suspend proceedings. However, this discretion is not unfettered and can be judicially reviewed if a manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers has occurred (as established in Atlas Transport).

In this case, it was made clear that the Board does not automatically have to suspend proceedings because one party requests it or merely because the earlier registration is the subject of a cancellation action. Even if the Board had examined the file properly and identified the cancellation action, it could still have formed the view that the request for suspension should be refused, to strike a proper balance between the interests involved. The Board's line of reasoning would have led it to refuse the request in any event.

The court confirmed that, in exercising its discretion, the Board must observe the general principles governing procedural fairness applicable across the European Union (EU). These principles include a requirement that the Board take into account not only the interests of the applicant but also those of the other parties. The decision on suspension therefore requires a weighing of the competing interests (as per Atlas Transport). The court then examined whether the weighing of interests was correctly performed in refusing the suspension.

The court considered that the Board had held that the cancellation action was irrelevant in any event as it had been brought after the appeal was filed and the written statement of grounds submitted. The court cited the STELLA decision (Case T-27/09) to the effect that it is possible for cancellation proceedings to proceed even if opposition proceedings based on that mark are pending. Cancellation and opposition proceedings are distinct, autonomous and independent. However, where the cancellation action follows after opposition proceedings, this can at most justify a suspension of the opposition on the basis that if the cancellation action succeeds, the opposition would be devoid of purpose (see further under ‘Analysis’ below).

The court held that it is not possible to conclude that the filing a cancellation action while opposition proceedings are still pending is evidence of bad faith. Thus the Board of Appeal could not validly base its refusal of the request for suspension solely on the fact that the cancellation action was filed after the appeal had been lodged and the written statement setting out the grounds of appeal had been submitted.

The Board had also based its decision on its serious doubts as to the applicant's true intentions, arising from the fact that the applicant had filed two previous cancellation actions while the opposition proceedings were pending. The Board believed that the motivation for these actions was to delay the outcome of the opposition proceedings in the present case or in other proceedings involving the parties. The court criticized the unelaborated reference by the Board to ‘other proceedings involving the parties’ and the lack of explanation as to what interest the applicant could have in delaying the opposition proceedings. The only reason that the court could deduce was that the Board believed the applicant anticipated a negative outcome in the opposition. The court considered this reason to be ‘not only abstract but also unsupported by any objective evidence and accordingly cannot justify the Board of Appeal's refusal to grant the request for suspension’. The court held that the previous cancellation actions had been concluded on procedural grounds (failure to pay stamp duty and withdrawal) and their merits had not been examined. This explained for the court why a third action had been filed. The court concluded that the Board's presumption that the applicant was seeking to delay the opposition without examining the circumstances of the earlier cancellation actions failed to take into account all aspects of the applicant's situation. The Board did not look at the whole picture and therefore could not be said to have properly weighed the various interests involved. Therefore the Board had infringed Article 76(1) CTMR in its consideration of the request for suspension. As this issue had to be dealt with before the consideration of the likelihood of confusion, the decision was annulled.

Analysis

The decision is interesting in that it reflects the high standard which it applies to consideration by OHIM Boards of Appeal of suspension requests. Although the Boards have a broad discretion in dealing with such requests, it is clear that it is incumbent on them to weigh the competing interests of all of the parties and to give proper consideration to the circumstances applicable to the request. Reasons that are abstract or insufficiently grounded in reality will not be sufficient. The General Court also referred to ‘objective evidence’ underlying the grounds of the decision. This decision makes it clear that the OHIM Boards of Appeal, although independent, are nonetheless still bound by the general principles of law governing procedural fairness such as weighing competing interests and cannot engage in manifest errors of assessment or misuse of powers in considering suspension requests.

This decision is also enlightening in its analysis of the interaction between cancellation and opposition actions. The court pointed out that, if a cancellation action filed after an opposition based on the challenged mark were to succeed, the opposition would be ‘devoid of purpose’. Significantly, the court did not say that the opposition would be bound to fail, merely that it would be devoid of purpose as the applicant could simply file a new application after the cancellation decision concludes, which also means that there is no advantage to the owner of the earlier mark to file opposition where its earlier mark is the subject of cancellation proceedings. The distinction between ‘devoid of purpose’ and ‘bound to fail’ presumably stems from the difference between a cancellation action such as invalidity, which renders the mark void ab initio, and a revocation action that would only cancel the registration from a particular date, which may be after the relevant date for the opposition (see the UK IPO Appointed Person's decision in Opposition O-338-10, re Application No. 2389521 NOW WIRELESS).

Practical significance

This decision is the first time a decision of the OHIM Boards of Appeal concerning suspension has been considered in the larger picture of overlying general legal principles and has been found wanting, notwithstanding the broad discretion of the Boards.

Although the administrative law principles of manifest errors of assessment and misuse of powers in procedural matters have only to date been explored in suspension requests, they could potentially have a role in analysing the exercise of other discretionary powers of the Boards.

The approach of the Boards to procedural matters can be difficult to predict, as they are not subject to the same rules of practice as the other divisions of OHIM. The practices and procedures of the Boards of Appeal are largely undocumented and different Boards often take different approaches to the same procedural issue. There seems to be little appetite in OHIM or the Boards to develop rules of practice for appeals, in case this is seen as interfering with the independence of the Boards. Against this background, the application of general legal principles – such as the need to weigh competing interests, the extension of the principles of manifest errors of assessment and misuse of powers from administrative law to judicial review of Board of Appeal suspension requests and perhaps other procedural matters in future and the willingness of the General Court to hold the Boards of Appeal to a high standard of assessment in such matters – are highly important safeguards.

Different degrees of similarity between normal and reputed trade marks lead to separate assessment

Author: Alberto Bellan (Universita' degli Studi di Milano)

Intra-Presse SAS and Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) v Golden Balls Ltd, Joined Cases C-581/13 P and C-582/13 P, Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), EU:C:2014:2387, 20 November 2014

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2015) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpv043, first published online: March 18, 2015

The degree of similarity required under Article 8(1)(b) and Article 8(5) of Regulation 207/2009, must be assessed differently. Article 8(1)(b requires a degree of similarity leading to a likelihood of confusion while Article 8(5) can be satisfied by a lower degree of similarity which exists whenever the relevant public make a connection between those marks or establishes a link between them. Whenever the opponent bases an opposition on both Article 8(1)(b) and Article 8(5), the court must assess the degree of similarity between the signs separately, such double assessment being avoidable only where the signs present no similarity at all.

Legal context

Under Article 62(1) of Regulation 40/94 (Article 64(1) of Regulation 207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark currently in force, the CTMR):
Following the examination as to the allowability of the appeal, the Board of Appeal shall decide on the appeal.
Under Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 40/94 and the CTMR:
Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered … if because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
Under Art 8(5) of Regulation 40/94 and the CTMR:
… upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark… , the trade mark applied for shall not be registered where it is identical with, or similar to, the earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services which are not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is registered, where, in the case of an earlier Community trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the Community … where the use without due cause of the trade mark applied for would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark.
Facts

In 2002, Golden Balls applied to register two Community word marks for some products and services in Classes 9, 16, 21, 24, 28 and 41. Intra-Presse, organizer of the FIFA Ballon d'Or competition, subsequently filed an opposition on the basis of its earlier Community ‘Ballon d'Or’ word marks, covering some products and services in classes 9, 14, 16, 28, and 41. The grounds of opposition were based on both likelihood of confusion under Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 40/94 and repute of the earlier mark under Article 8(5) of the same Regulation.

In 2010 the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) Opposition Division ruled in favour of Golden Balls, establishing that the signs were visually and phonetically different, and that their slight conceptual similarity for a section of the relevant public (namely, the English and French speaking part) was not enough to establish likelihood of confusion and thus trigger protection under Article 8(5) of CTMR.

In 2011, an OHIM Board of Appeal partially upheld the appeal. While the marks were visually and phonetically different, the Board of Appeal found that the ‘Golden Balls’ and ‘Ballon d'Or’ signs were conceptually ‘identical or at the least extremely similar’. Accordingly, likelihood of confusion under Article 8(1)(b) CTMR could be established for all the goods and services involved, except for some goods in class 9 and all the goods in classes 21 and 24. The Board of Appeal held that it was not necessary to take into consideration Intra-Presse's claims under Art 8(5) CTMR.

In 2013, the General Court (GC) dismissed Intra-Presse's claims in their entirety, holding that the huge visual and phonetic differences and the slight conceptual adherences between the signs, globally considered, lead those trade marks to be considered dissimilar under Article 8(1)(b) CTMR. From the lack of similarity between the signs at issue for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b), the GC inferred the impossibility for ‘Ballon d'Or’ to access the extended protection provided under Article 8(5), whose application also requires ‘similarity’ between the signs at issue. Intra-Presse appealed the GC's judgment to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

Analysis

The CJEU partially annulled the decisions of the Board of Appeal, and referred the case back to the latter for further consideration and set aside the General Court's judgments.

As regards the Board of Appeal's decision, the CJEU noted that Art 62(1) of Regulation 40/94 and Art 64(1) of the CTMR, as interpreted in earlier CJEU case law (OHIM v Kaul, C-29/05 P, EU:C:2007:162, para 57), provides that the Board of Appeal is called upon to carry out a new, full examination of the merits of the opposition, in terms both of law and fact. In the present case, Intra-Presse had based its claims both upon Articles 8(1)(b) and 8(5) of the CTMR. The Board of Appeal only considered Article 8(1)(b), consequently dismissing Intra-Presse's claims as regards some goods in class 9 and all of the goods in classes 21 and 24. As the Board of Appeal did not consider Intra-Presse's plea alleging infringement of Article 8(5), it failed to fulfil its obligation to carry out a new, full examination of the merits of the oppositions under Article 64(1) of CTMR. Accordingly, the CJEU partially annulled the Board of Appeal decision to the extent that it dismissed Intra-Presse's claims against the registration of the opposed application in relation to some goods in class 9 and to all the goods in classes 21 and 24.

As for the GC judgment, the CJEU held that the GC erred to the extent that it had applied the same criteria to assess similarity under Article 8(1)(b) and Art 8(5) of the CTMR, inferring from the lack of similarity between the signs at issue for the purposes of Art 8(1)(b) that the application of Article 8(5) had had to be excluded.

In this regard, the CJEU made reference to its earlier case law according to which the degree of similarity required under Article 8(1)(b) CTMR, on the one hand, and Article 8(5) on the other, have to be assessed differently. Indeed, while application of Article 8(1)(b) is conditional upon a degree of similarity between the signs at stake leading to a likelihood of confusion, a lower degree of similarity is required to trigger the protection of trade marks with a reputation under Article 8(5), such similarity existing whenever the relevant public made a connection between those marks or established a link between them (Ferrero v OHMI, C-552/09 P, EU:C:2011:177). Consequently, the CJEU continued, claims based upon Article 8(5) could be manifestly dismissed only when no similarity at all existed between the marks at issue. As the GC found ‘Golden Balls’ and ‘Ballon d'or’ to be slightly similar on a conceptual level, it erred in law as it had ruled out the application of Article 8(5) without ascertaining whether that faint degree of conceptual similarity was nevertheless sufficient for the relevant public to establish a link between those marks.

Practical significance

This decision illustrates how European (and, even more often, national) courts have still not fully metabolised the true nature of the extended scope of protection granted to reputed trade marks (CTMR, Art 8(5)) and how it diverges from traditional protection based upon likelihood of confusion (CTMR, Art 8(1)(b)). In this case the CJEU stresses again that the different degrees of similarity required to trigger those two levels of protection lead to an obligation for the courts to carry out two separate assessments in case of actions involving claims under both Article 8(1)(b) and Article 8(5). That double assessment might be avoidable only in one case, when the comparison of the two signs under Article 8(1)(b) leads to the conclusion that no similarity at all there exists between them. By contrast, whenever even a slight degree of similarity is found, it is mandatory for the court to assess whether that low level of similarity, albeit not enough to cause likelihood of confusion, could however make the relevant public establish a link between the earlier reputed mark and the later sign. The lack of such double assessment may lead to the annulment of the decision in whole or part.

Validity of the Rubik's Cube as a shape mark upheld

Authors: Joel Smith, Sarah Burke and Silja Nordmeyer-Andrez (Herbert Smith Freehills LLP)

Simba Toys GmbH & Co KG v OHIM Case T-450/09, 25 November 2014, General Court of the European Union

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2015) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpv010, first published online: February 26, 2015

The General Court has dismissed a cancellation action by Simba Toys in respect of the Community trade mark registration for the 3D shape of the Rubik's Cube. The way in which the mark is graphically presented does not involve a technical solution and, therefore, it can be validly registered as a shape trade mark.

Legal context

Simba Toys sought to invalidate the Rubik's Cube shape mark on eight different grounds under Council Regulation 40/94 on the Community trade mark and the Community Trade Mark Regulation 207/2009 (CTMR). While the CTMR replaced Regulation 40/94 in 2009, the invalidity action had started before the CTMR came into effect, so some of Simba Toys' arguments were based upon the old Regulation and some were under the CTMR.

Simba Toys advanced arguments under Articles 75 and 76(1) of the CTMR saying that the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) should state the reasons on which it has based its decisions and that it should examine the facts of its own motion, but in proceedings for refusal of registration, it shall only have regard to the facts, evidence and arguments provided by the parties and the relief sought.

Article 7 of Regulation 40/94 contains the absolute grounds for refusal of registration of marks. Simba Toys relied upon all three of the exclusions in relation to shape marks in Article 7(1)(e)(i) to (iii) of Regulation 40/94, which set out that shape marks may be refused if (i) the signs consist exclusively of the shape which results from the nature of the goods themselves; (ii) the signs consist exclusively of the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result; or (iii) the signs consist exclusively of the shape which gives substantial value to the goods.

Simba Toys also argued that the Rubik's Cube mark was devoid of distinctive character under Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 40/94, and that it consisted exclusively of signs or indications which may serve to designate a characteristic of the goods under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 40/94. Finally, Simba Toys put forward an argument under Article 7(3) of Regulation 40/94, to the effect that OHIM had not considered whether the trade mark had become distinctive for the goods concerned through use.

Facts

A Community trade mark (CTM) for the following sign was registered for ‘three-dimensional puzzles’ in Class 26 by Seven Towns Ltd in 1999:

In 2006, Simba Toys filed a declaration of invalidity with OHIM, which was rejected by the Cancellation Division in 2008. An appeal was lodged by Simba Toys in 2008, and was dismissed in 2009 by the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM (the ‘contested decision’). Simba Toys appealed to the General Court seeking annulment of the contested decision, and argued that OHIM had breached the Regulations on the grounds mentioned above.

Analysis

The General Court dismissed Simba Toys' action in its entirety, holding that all eight pleas were unfounded. The CTM for the Rubik's Cube had been validly registered.

Article 76(1) of the CTMR: the General Court found that the Board of Appeal had exhaustively examined the arguments and evidence before it. In any event, following the 2013 case of Fürstlich Castell'sches Domänenamt v OHIM (T30-10), there is no requirement for a Board of Appeal to examine facts of its own motion in invalidity proceedings, if it does not consider such an analysis relevant to the proceedings.

The first sentence of Article 75 of the CTMR: as established by Anheuser-Busch v OHIM (T-191/07) in 2009, the Board of Appeal's reasoning can be implicit and it does not need to consider every point. The General Court held that the Board of Appeal's analysis of the distinctive character of the Rubik's Cube constituted sufficient analysis.

Article 7(1)(e)(i) of Regulation 40/94: the General Court dismissed Simba Toys' claim that the Board of Appeal failed to take into account that the individual features of the mark were dictated by the ‘function’ of the product. It was clear that 3D puzzles can assume a multitude of shapes, and it was in no way essential for 3D puzzles to assume the shape of a cube with surfaces bearing a grid structure.

Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation 40/94: the General Court considered the 2008 and 2010 decisions in the Lego Juris v OHIM (T-270/06 and C-48/09P) cases in determining the essential characteristics of a sign. The question is not whether the essential features have a technical function, but whether the shape of the goods is ‘technically causal of, and sufficient to obtain, the intended technical result’ (Lego Juris v OHIM, 2008). As the cube per se and the grid structure of the cube constitute the Rubik's Cube essential elements, there was no causal link between the shape and the rotating capability. The General Court distinguished the 2002 Philips case (Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd, C-299/09), in which the shape claimed clearly indicated the technical function of shaving.

Article 7(1)(e)(iii) of Regulation 40/94: as Simba Toys' claim related to functional features of the Rubik's Cube and not to a substantial value flowing from the ‘aesthetic aspect’ of its shape, the General Court held that this claim had not been validly established and that Article 7(1)(e)(iii) does not apply.

Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 40/94: in order to establish the distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b), the distinctive character must serve to identify the product in question as originating from a particular company. The General Court affirmed that there is a presumption of validity for registered CTMs, and that it is for the applicant to provide evidence to the contrary. The General Court held that the mere fact that there is a puzzle available on the market which resembles the Rubik's Cube was not sufficient to indicate a lack of distinctive character. The Rubik's Cube has distinctive character which enables consumers to identify the producer of the goods.

Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 40/94: there is no real link between the Rubik's Cube and 3D puzzles in general. The relevant public is to be assessed by reference to the average consumer and not to professionals in the field. For the relevant average consumer, the bold black lines on the Rubik's Cube do not automatically link to the rotating capability of the Rubik's Cube.

Article 7(3) of Regulation 40/94: the General Court agreed with the Board of Appeal's finding that the Rubik's Cube mark was inherently distinctive. Therefore, it followed that it was not necessary to examine whether distinctive character had been acquired through use.

Practical significance

Shape trade marks offer a limited monopoly. In this case, the mark as registered does not allow the trade mark owner to prevent third parties from marketing all types of 3D puzzles with rotating capabilities. The monopoly is strictly limited to 3D puzzles that have the shape of a cube with a grid structure on its surfaces.

A mark will be unregistrable if the shape of the goods is ‘technically causal of, and sufficient to obtain, the intended technical result’. However, a CTM cannot be refused on the ground that the shape merely incorporates a technical function. The rotating capability of the Rubik's Cube does not result from the black lines or the grid structure but from an internal mechanism (which is not visible in the graphic representation of the mark).

Care should be taken in the way in which shape marks are graphically represented as protection will be limited to the observable features and not necessarily include technical functions, unless such a function is the logical consequence of the respective sign. In this case, the image of a 3D cube did not necessarily imply a rotating function so there was no protection afforded to the trade mark owner for this feature.

General Court holds K-Swiss five-stripe mark invalid

Author: Matthew Dick (D Young & Co LLP)

K-Swiss, Inc v OHIM and Künzli SwissSchuh AG, Case T-85/13, EU:T:2014:509, General Court of the European Union, 14 June 2014

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2014) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpu224, First published online: December 3, 2014

The General Court of the European Union has recently decided that the following Community trade mark registration owned by K-Swiss, Inc for ‘footwear’ is invalid on absolute grounds as it lacks distinctiveness.

Künzli applied to invalidate Community trade mark (CTM) registration no 4771978 (the ‘contested mark’) owned by K-Swiss on absolute grounds on the basis of Articles 51(1)(a) and 7(1)(b) of Regulation 40/94 (now Articles 52(1)(a) and 7(1)(b) of Regulation 207/2009). These provisions prohibit the registration of trade marks which lack distinctiveness and which are therefore incapable of indicating the commercial origin of the goods and services covered by the mark.

Facts

K-Swiss applied for the contested mark in December 2005 in respect of ‘footwear’. The application was published in July 2006, and the contested mark was registered in August 2007.

In February 2009, Künzli filed an application for a declaration of invalidity against the contested mark in its entirety at the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM). The Cancellation Division of OHIM assessed the matter and referred to the fact that manufacturers of sports and leisure shoes often place figurative and decorative elements as trade marks on the sides of shoes, particularly because sports shoes are frequently presented to consumers side-on, on shelves in stores. The Cancellation Division accepted that this is a common practice to which consumers are accustomed and confirmed their view that consumers can in principle be guided by such practices to indicate the commercial origin of a product they are purchasing.

The Cancellation Division added, however, that very simple elements, for example seams which are purely decorative or required for technical reasons, cannot be considered to have distinctive character. In light of this, the Cancellation Division upheld the application for a declaration of invalidity on the basis that the contested mark did not provide ‘an adequate point of contact for a function that indicates the commercial origin’ of the shoes, as consumers would view the five stripes as necessary to reinforce the shoe or as an indistinct embellishment.

K-Swiss appealed to the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM, and, in October 2012, the Board dismissed the appeal. The Board held that signs which are indistinguishable from the appearance of the goods themselves will only be distinctive if they depart significantly from the norms or customs of the sector. Accordingly, the Board considered that the contested mark did not possess the minimum degree of distinctiveness required for registration as it was not distinguishable from the appearance of the product which it covers (ie a shoe) and did not possess any distinctive character in relation to those goods. In particular, the Board considered that the contested mark
… does not depart significantly from the standard designs that are shown on the sides of these kind of goods and will be perceived simply as decorations, namely a variation of the patterns commonly found on shoes, without a characteristic, memorable or eye-catching feature in the sign that would make it distinguishable from the appearance of a part of that product and that endows it with distinctive character for the goods in question (Case R 174/2011-2, at Para.31).
The Board agreed with the Cancellation Division that the contested mark would be perceived as embellishment rather than an indicator of origin.

The Board was not persuaded by K-Swiss's arguments that similar marks had previously been registered by OHIM: every individual mark must be assessed on its own merits. The Board also dismissed K-Swiss's evidence that the contested mark had been registered in a number of European Union Member States, pointing out that OHIM must base its decisions solely on the Regulation.

K-Swiss appealed to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) which dismissed its appeal. The court confirmed that the contested mark was indistinguishable from the appearance of the product it designates, ie shoes. According to the court, this was so even if the contested mark was characterized as a ‘position mark’ (as K-Swiss argued it should be). The court considered that, even if the contested mark was limited to five parallel stripes to be positioned on the side of shoes, it would still be a design intended to be placed on part of the products and therefore could be distinguished from the appearance of the products, as it is likely to be considered by consumers to be merely decorative.

The court agreed with the Board's finding that consumers would not consider that decorative elements on the sides of shoes are indicators of the commercial origin of the product, unless such elements have been fixed in the minds of consumers through intensive use.

The court also considered that the contested mark did not depart significantly from the customs or norms of the sector. Further, in order to be considered to have distinctive character,
… a design applied to the surface of a product must be capable of being apprehended without the product's inherent qualities being perceived simultaneously, so that the design can be easily and instantly recalled by the relevant public as a distinctive sign.
Ultimately K-Swiss had not proven that the contested mark, applied to the external surface of business or dress shoes, could be apprehended without the intrinsic characteristics of those shoes being perceived at the same time.

Analysis

In reaching its decision, the court considered a number of cases relating to shape marks, which essentially established that such marks are not capable of registration unless they depart significantly from the norms or customs of the sector. While this requirement is understandable when considering three-dimensional marks, where the basic design of the product is similar across the industry, it is more difficult to apply to two-dimensional designs such as lines and patterns, where it is harder to argue that there is an industry norm as such.

The decision also suggests that simply stating that a mark is intended to be a ‘position mark’ will not assist an applicant in registering a mark which is inherently lacking in distinctiveness. Nor does the fact that some signs placed on the side of shoes have acquired distinctive character through use suggest that consumers have learned to establish a link between any sign placed on the side of a shoe and a particular manufacturer.

Perhaps most importantly, the General Court stated:
[I]n order to be conceded distinctive character, a design applied to the surface of a product must be capable of being apprehended without the product's inherent qualities being perceived simultaneously, so that the design can be easily and instantly recalled by the relevant public as a distinctive sign.
The fact that the K-Swiss registration did not include a verbal indication noting that the registration covered the mark as applied to the sides of shoes was not necessarily determinative, but it did not help its case. Nevertheless, the court seems to be saying that the fact that a sign is intended to be a ‘position mark’ is not a valid argument that will assist in claiming inherent distinctiveness.

Practical significance

This case is the latest in a line of recent cases at both OHIM and the CJEU which have the effect of making it more difficult to register marks such as these. It is hoped that further guidance will ultimately be forthcoming on the question of when a mark may be held to be indistinguishable from the appearance of the relevant product, as many logos and trade marks are applied to products such as t-shirts and sweatshirts in a similar manner to the five stripes in this case. If such marks are to be treated in the same way as the contested mark, a high hurdle has been set for trade mark owners. At the time of writing, no appeal has been filed in this case.

David versus Goliath chocolate trade mark dispute: does size count when applying the concept of genuine use?

Author: Valentina Torelli (Salvador Ferrandis & Partners, Madrid, Spain)

Reber Holding GmbH & Co KG v OHIM, Wedl & Hofmann GmbH, C-141/13 P, EU:C:2014:2089, Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 17 July 2014

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2014) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpu175, first published online: September 19, 2014

This long-running dispute saw a small and medium enterprise (SME) opposing a large corporation for the exclusivity in the word Walzertraum, which featured in both their trade marks for goods in the same market sector. Resolving this dispute, the CJEU clarified what it is meant by genuine use within the European Union, what criteria are to identify it, what its purpose is, irrespective of the size of the undertakings concerned.

Legal context

Article 43(2) of Regulation 40/94 on the Community trade mark (CTM) provided that, during the opposition proceeding before the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM), a CTM applicant can require the other party to prove genuine use in the Community of the earlier CTM in relation to the goods and services for which it is registered and on which the opposition is based, unless there are proper reasons for non-use, and provided that two requisites are met:
* the earlier CTM has been used during a period of five years preceding the date of publication of the CTM application; and

* the earlier CTM has at that date been registered for not less than five years.
According to Article 43(3) of Regulation 40/94, the same rule applies to national trade marks in respect of proof of use in the Member States in which they are protected.

Finally, Rule 22(3) of Regulation 2868/95, implementing the CTM Regulation (as amended by Regulation 1041/2005), sets out the guidelines to substantiate the proof of use:
The indications and evidence for the furnishing of proof of use shall consist of indications concerning the place, time, extent and nature of use of the opposing trade mark for the goods and services in respect of which it is registered and on which the opposition is based, and evidence in support of these indications in accordance with paragraph 4.
Although the concept of genuine use is not expressly defined, Community legislation furnishes the criteria whereby the use of a trade mark in the relevant territory is qualified as genuine. In addition, the courts of the European Union have pronounced on this issue several times, addressing both practitioners and users in dealing with the proof of use.

Facts

Austrian company Wedl & Hofmann (W&H) applied to register the figurative mark represented below, mainly featuring the word ‘Walzertraum’, as a CTM for ‘coffee; instant coffee; decaffeinated coffee; sugar’ (Class 30), in August 2005.



A few days after publication of the CTM application, in February 2006, German company Reber opposed, claiming a likelihood of confusion with its earlier national word mark ‘Walzertraum’, registered for ‘bakery products, confectionery, chocolate and sugar confectionery’ (also in Class 30).

W&H cleverly asked for the proof of use of the German Walzertraum mark. While the initial opposition was upheld by the Opposition Division, it was subsequently rejected by the Board of Appeal for lack of probative value of the documents submitted by Reber. These were:
A written statement of Reber's manager, dated 31 January 2007;

Two undated photographs displaying the Reber confectionery;

Copies of the chocolates' monthly lists of sales for the period from March 2001 to December 2002;

Excerpts from Reber's website, displaying different kinds of chocolate marketed by the company, dated 30 March 2004 and 23 January 2007.
The Board of Appeal concluded that Reber had not proved genuine use of its national mark between the relevant period of 13 February 2001 to 12 February 2006. Some of evidence fell outside that period while the other documents, although belonging to that time frame, were insufficient to sustain proof of use under Rule 22(3) of Regulation 2868/95.

On appeal to the General Court, Reber presented two pleas in law. The first plea concerned the wrong interpretation of Articles 42(2) and 42(3) of Regulation 207/2009, in that the Board of Appeal erroneously denied the genuine use of the Walzertraum mark, given the volume of the sales and the number of sale points. The second plea referred to the violation of the principle of equal treatment as Reber had been discriminated against in comparison to multinational companies in respect to the proof of the genuine use. Said Reber, the proof of use is more complicated for a small and medium sized enterprise (SME), especially as regards the volume of sales, and this issue was treated in the present case differently to a previous dispute (R1101/2004-1), in which Reber succeeded in proving the genuine use of one of its marks in similar conditions, where the relevant goods were pralines. The General Court simply affirmed the Board of Appeal's decision as to the first plea in law and rejected the violation of the principle of equal treatment.

Before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Reber appealed the contested decision on the same two grounds.

Analysis

The CJEU first observed that the pertinent legislation was Regulation 40/94, given that the Walzertraum CTM had been applied for on 16 August 2005. The court opened its reasoning about the wrong application of Article 43(2) and (3) of this Regulation, citing its previous judgments in Leno Merken C-149/11, EU:C:2012:816, para 29; La Mer Technology, C-259/02, EU:C:2004:50, para 27; and Ansul, C-40/01, EU:C:2003:145, para 43. Accordingly, the concept of genuine use is inherently connected with the trade mark's function as origin identifier of the goods and services for which the mark is registered. That said, use is genuine when it is directed at creating or maintaining a market share in the sector concerned for those goods and services.

The CJEU added that the assessment of the genuine use must be based on all the facts and circumstances relevant to establishing the real exploitation of the trade mark in the course of trade, according to rule 22(3) of Regulation 2868/95. To this extent, referring to its previous case law in Ansul, EU:C:2003:145, para 39, the court explained that, although the use of a mark does not always need to be quantitatively significant to be deemed genuine, the nature of the products and the geographical extent of the use are to be considered.

The CJEU thus concluded that the General Court did nor err in applying the concept of genuine use, considering that the Reber's Walzertraum mark had been geographically and quantitatively limited to a local and narrow exploitation: an annual sale of 40–60 kg of chocolates from March 2001 to December 2002, directed to 80 million German consumers and which occurred solely at the Reber confectionery in Bad Reichenhall, a town of 18 000 inhabitants.

The CJEU also rejected Reber's argument claiming that the assessment of its mark's genuine use should have considered the artisanal nature of the products for which the mark is registered, namely pralines. On the contrary, the court affirmed that such assessment must be based on the products and services as specified in the trade mark application, being simply chocolates in the present case, and not on a specific marketing concept.

Finally, the CJEU said nothing about Reber's marketing on the internet, since this was not a matter of law and it fell outside its competence, and confirmed that the Community and the national trade mark systems are autonomous so that neither the OHIM nor the European judicatures are bound by national decisions. As a consequence, the German decision recognizing the Walzertraum mark's genuine use was not relevant here.

In regard to the second plea in law, the CJEU did not expressly state whether the assessment of the genuine use was more complicated for SMEs than for multinational companies. As Reber only reiterated the same plea and arguments submitted before the General Court with the purpose of securing the revision of that claim, those arguments were inadmissible.

However, it seems that the CJEU agreed with the General Court's reasoning affirming that, when the genuine use of Reber's Walzertraum mark had been assessed, no discrimination had occurred as regards the company's size. The CJEU simply referred to the contested decision on the violation of the principle of equal treatment, both on the ground that the artisanal nature of the chocolates should not play any role in assessing the genuine use and that the General Court is not bound by previous OHIM's decisions.

Practical significance

The concept of genuine use has been conceived to create legal and commercial certainty as regards a real and relevant exploitation of both Community and national trade marks in the European Union Internal Market. This concept plays a fundamental role in trade marks' life cycles as it applies both to the opposition and the cancellation proceedings before the OHIM. Thus the Community legislation has set out the criteria to establish when the use of a trade mark is deemed to be genuine while the European judicatures, as in the Walzertraum case, have elaborated the relevant case law to avoid marks' token uses. Consequently, this ruling serves to enable trade mark holders to maintain their titles and their market shares by means of the use of a mark in connection with its essential function as a business identifier and with the specific products and services for which it is registered. Should it be possible to modify the assessment of the genuine use according to the companies' size, thus providing facilitated treatment for SMEs in respect to multinational corporations, it would lead not only to market distortions but also to violation of the mentioned principle of equal treatment.

Switzerland still not part of Germany, even for trade mark purposes

Author: Jeremy Phillips (Editor, Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice)

Case C-445/12 P Rivella International AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), Baskaya Di Baskaya Alim E C Sas, Court of Justice of the European Union (First Chamber), 12 December 2013

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2014) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpu032, first published online: April 2, 2014

The use of a trade mark in Switzerland may, by its very nature, be deemed to constitute use of that mark in Germany, under the terms of a bilateral treaty between Germany and Switzerland on the reciprocal recognition of use of intellectual property rights, but the effect of that treaty does not extend to such deemed use being use of an earlier mark in Germany under the opposition provisions of the autonomous system for the Community trade mark.

Legal context

Under Article 42(3) of the Regulation 207/2009 on the Community trade mark, an applicant for registration of a Community trade mark is entitled to request an opponent to furnish proof of use of an earlier national trade mark upon which the opposition is founded. Such use must be within the territory of the Member State to which that earlier mark belongs. Article 5 of the 1892 Convention between Switzerland and Germany on the reciprocal protection of patents, designs and trade marks provides that use of a trade mark in Switzerland is the equivalent to the use of that mark in Germany.

Facts

Baskaya applied to register as a Community trade mark a figurative sign, depicted below, in which the word ‘baskaya’ was portrayed beneath a line of five stars on a red oval background.


The goods in respect of which registration was sought were ‘meat, fish, poultry and game; meat extracts; preserved, dried and cooked fruits and vegetables; jellies, jams, fruit sauces; eggs, milk and milk products; edible oils and fats’ (Class 29), ‘coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, rice, tapioca, sago, artificial coffee; flour and preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry and confectionery, ices; honey, treacle; yeast, baking-powder; salt, mustard; vinegar, sauces (condiments); spices; ice’ (Class 30) and ‘beers; mineral and aerated waters and other non-alcoholic drinks; fruit drinks and fruit juices; syrups and other preparations for making beverages’ (Class 32).


Rivella opposed the application, invoking a likelihood of confusion for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 40/94 (now Art 8(1)(b) of Regulation 207/2009). The opposition was based on the earlier international figurative mark, depicted above, with effect in Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Austria and the Benelux countries, for ‘beer, ale and porter; mineral and aerated waters and other non-alcoholic drinks; syrups and other preparations for making beverages’ (Class 32).

Baskaya sought, as it was entitled to do, proof of use of the earlier trade mark by Rivella. At this point, events took an unusual turn since, in March 2009, Rivella said that it was maintaining the opposition only in respect of the German part of its international registration; the company submitted a number of documents as proof of use of its mark in Switzerland. It relied, in that regard, on Article 5 of the 1892 Convention between Switzerland and Germany on the reciprocal protection of patents, designs and trade marks. According to Rivella, under that convention, use of its mark in Switzerland was equivalent to its use in Germany. The Opposition Division rejected the opposition for lack of proof of use of the earlier trade mark within Germany since that the documents provided by Rivella showed that the mark cited in opposition was used only in Switzerland and rejected the application of the 1892 Convention.

Rivella then appealed unsuccessfully to the Fourth Board of Appeal. In the view of the Board of Appeal, the only relevant legal framework within which the use of Rivella's mark was to be considered was that of Regulation 207/2009 on the Community trade mark and, more specifically, Articles 42(2) and (3) of that Regulation, under which the earlier trade mark must have been put to genuine use in the Member State in which it was protected.

Rivella then brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the Board of Appeal's decision. The sole basis of this action was that since, under Article 5(1) of the 1892 Convention, a trade mark was deemed to be used in Germany if it was used in Switzerland, Rivella was not further obliged to furnish proof of genuine use of its earlier trade mark in Germany.

The General Court considered that questions relating to the proof furnished in support of the grounds for opposition to an application for registration of a Community trade mark and questions relating to the territorial aspect of the use of marks were governed exclusively by the relevant provisions of Regulation 207/2009, irrespective of the domestic law of the Member States. The national or international nature of an earlier trade mark cited in Community opposition proceedings in no way meant that the national law applicable to that earlier trade mark was applicable in those proceedings. Although procedures for the registration of trade marks were covered by the national law of each Member State, the same could not be said of the determination of the territory in which genuine use of the earlier trade mark must be established, as that question was governed by EU law. Accordingly the General Court dismissed Rivella's action for annulment.

Rivella then appealed further to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), in essence raising a subtler version of its earlier ground of appeal. The CJEU dismissed the appeal.

Analysis

The appeal turned principally on two propositions. Rivella first argued that the General Court erred in law by applying the genuine use requirement under Article 42(3) to its earlier trade mark, even though that trade mark was an international trade mark rather than a national trade mark and was therefore not covered by those provisions. The CJEU disagreed. Article 42(3) did not, however, distinguish national trade marks from those granted under the international registration system since the term ‘earlier national trade marks’ mentioned in Article 42(3) had to be understood as referring trade marks which had effect in a Member State, regardless of their provenance via national or international grant mechanisms. If this were not so, observed the CJEU, Rivella's argument would circumvent the trade mark protection system of which Articles 42(2) and 42(3) formed part, depriving them of their useful effect.

Rivella next argued that the question of the ‘territorial validity’ of a nationally registered trade mark was exclusively governed by national law, especially in the case of national trade marks which have been registered under international arrangements and which had effect in a Member State. However, Rivella was in effect seeking to plead its German trade mark in the same manner as a national defensive trade mark, but the CJEU in Case C-234/06 P Il Ponte Finanziaria v OHIM [2007] ECR I-7333 had already ruled that a defensive trade mark, under which an earlier trade mark was protected on the basis of national law even if its use could not be established, could not be used to oppose the registration of a Community trade mark.

Practical significance

The line of argument taken by Rivella is one with which many readers will be familiar: a ground of appeal which is too attractive to ignore, yet too flimsy to stand a chance of succeeding.

In legal terms, this opposition is a story of unmitigated defeat for Rivella. In the world of business and commerce, it is something of a triumph in that Baskaya's Community trade mark application has been kept off the register for over six years. Baskaya would have been in a far better position if the Opposition Division had accepted that the use in Switzerland was indeed use in Germany and then dismissed the opposition on the ground that the respective marks were insufficiently similar to one another for there to be any likelihood of confusion, an outcome which in this author's opinion is by far the more probable one.