Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts

Editorial - The 125th anniversary of the German utility model – A reason to celebrate?

For our current issue, Editorial Board member Karsten Königer (Harmsen Utescher, Hamburg) has penned a very interesting editorial on utility models in Germany, first introduced in 1891. Karsten calls for a reflection on the role of utility models, highlighting several reasons (e.g. requirements for protection, costs, etc.) that explain why "the German utility model does not meet the apparent expectations of the German legislator."


The 125th anniversary of the German utility model – A reason to celebrate? 

Karsten Königer

On 1 October 1891, the first German Act on Utility Models (“Gebrauchsmuster”) came into force – creating a new industrial property right for technical inventions, in addition to the patent. 
125 years later, there are about 85,000 registered German utility models in force (the maximum term of protection is ten years). Can we be congratulated? Have the legislator’s expectations been met? 
In 1985, in a proposal for a new version of the Act, which was later enacted, the German government gave the following reasons for the utility model: ‘The utility model is mainly [designed] to quickly and inexpensively make available a manageable industrial property right for sole inventors and small and medium-sized enterprises for their everyday life inventions.’ The term ‘everyday life inventions’ was apparently used to describe inventions that involve only a small inventive step. 
The German utility model can indeed be obtained quickly. It is registered without examination within a few months after application and gives rise to injunctive relief. It can also be created by ‘branching off’ from a patent application or from a patent under opposition. In this respect, the utility model meets the expectations of the German legislator. But what about the other goals? 
In the year 2006, the German Federal Court of Justice held that regarding the requirement of inventive step in utility model law the same principles apply as in patent law. The court stated that it could not find a capable criterion for protectability that lies between non-obviousness in terms of patent law and novelty. Thus, apart from a different definition of the state of the art - German utility model law provides a grace period! - only inventions that would also meet the requirements of patentability can be protected by a German utility model. Why then should an inventor file a utility model application instead of a patent application - and waive ten years of protection? 
As mentioned above, the German legislator had the idea that the utility model was, compared to the patent, manageable, i.e. easy to handle, and cheaper. In reality, however, a utility model application is as difficult as a patent application. Moreover, unlike in the patent granting procedure it is not possible to correct certain mistakes. The German utility model application has the same structure as a patent application: claims, description and possibly drawings. The scope of protection is determined by the claims as it is for patents. This structure requires that a utility model application is written by a person who is as competent as an educated patent agent. The idea that a utility model application needs less care and competence than a patent application can have fatal consequences especially for sole inventors. 
As regards costs, the differences between the official fees for the application and maintenance of a utility model and a patent, respectively, are rather symbolic. The significant costs for the utility model application and the patent application are the attorney’s fees anyway. Thus, also from the financial point of view, there should be no reason for an applicant to prefer a German utility model to a German patent application. 
In sum, the German utility model does not meet the apparent expectations of the German legislator. It can be a useful additional tool for the inventor. However, these advantages for the inventor, if wanted, could be reached by small changes to patent law: re-introduction of a grace period and, if desired, injunctive relief based on a published patent application (cf. Article 67 EPC). More problematic than the limited usefulness of the German utility model is, in my view, that it also causes costs that have to be paid by competitors who are confronted with the registration of the unexamined right. Since the utility model is not examined by the Patent Office, the competitors are forced to examine the validity of the claims. These costs can be especially high for small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) which are not used to such examinations and need more advice. Thus, in many cases, SMEs are not the beneficiaries of the fact that the utility model is not examined, but the victims. 
Considering, I hesitate to say “Stay as you are” and to wish for another 125 years. 
© The Author(s) 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

Gold bear wars reloaded

Author: Birgit Clark (Venner Shipley LLP, London)

Higher Regional Court of Cologne (Oberlandesgericht Köln), Case ref: 6 U 230/12, 11 April 2014

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2014) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpu128, first published online: July 16, 2014

Disagreeing with the first instance court, the Higher Regional Court of Cologne held that sweetmaker Lindt's three-dimensional gold-foiled chocolate bears did not infringe Haribo's well-known GOLDBÄREN gummy bear (word) trade marks.

Legal context

In accordance with Article 5(2) of the European Union's Trade Mark Directive, Article 14(2) No 3 of the German Trade Mark Act (MarkenG) provides that it constitutes trade mark infringement ‘if a third party without having consent of the trade mark owner in the course of trade exploits the distinctive character or the repute of a well-known trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered without due cause and by such use takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark’.

Facts

German confectioner Haribo had sold its multi-coloured gummy bears wrapped in gold-coloured packaging since the 1960s and owned various registered trade mark rights in these, inter alia, covering confectionery: GOLDBÄR (in English: gold bear) and its plural form GOLDBÄREN as well as its ‘Goldbär device’; a yellow-gold coloured bear device wearing a red ribbon bow. Haribo's competitor, Swiss confectioner Lindt, producer of the well-known chocolate Gold Bunnies, had made and sold gold-foil wrapped chocolate bears (the ‘Lindt Teddy’, wearing a red ribbon bow) since 2011. Haribo took objection and brought a claim against the distribution of Lindt's chocolate bears in Germany based on its trade mark rights, asking for information, damages and the destruction of Lindt's products. In essence, Haribo argued that Lindt's bears amounted to a three-dimensional representation of Haribo's gummy bear trade marks. Lindt denied infringement and argued that gold foil and red ribbon as used on its chocolate Lindt Teddies were the same as those used on its well-known Easter chocolate Gold Bunnies. Lindt also stressed that it had intentionally refrained from using brand names such as ‘Goldbär’ or ‘Gold Teddy’ and that gold was a traditional Christmas colour. The Swiss chocolate maker thus invited the court to find that the competing products did not look in any way similar so that consumers would not be confused.

Analysis

The first instance court, the Regional Court of Cologne (Landgericht Köln, 33 O 803/11, 18 December 2012) agreed with Haribo and held that Lindt's three-dimensional gold-foiled chocolate bears amounted to an infringing ‘visual representation’ of Haribo's well-known GOLDBÄREN gummy bear word mark under Article 14(2) No 3 MarkenG. In view of the Landgericht, the appearance of the shape of Lindt's chocolate bears inevitably produced connotations with Haribo's bears.

Bearing in mind that there had so far been no decision by the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) on the question of a conflict between a word mark and a three-dimensional product design, the first instance judges emphasized that that there could be similarity between different ‘categories of trade marks’.

The Landgericht therefore applied legal principles which the Bundesgerichtshof had previously developed in precedents concerning a conflict between word marks and figurative trade marks (BGH GRUR 1971, 251, 252—Oldtimer; BGH GRUR 2004, 779, 783—Zwilling/Zweibrüder) and according to which there could be similarity where there was not only a ‘concordance in theme’ but where a term was the ‘obvious, unforced and exhaustive description’ adopted by consumers.

On Lindt's appeal to the Higher Regional Court of Cologne, the appeal judges agreed with Lindt and confirmed the lower court's view that—in theory—a word trade mark, such as ‘Goldbär’, could be infringed by a three dimensional shape, such as the defendant's chocolate teddy. However, the appeal court did not agree with the Landgericht's application of the Bundesgerichtshof's precedents in the Oldtimer and Zwilling/Zweibrüder cases on a potential similarity between different ‘categories of trade marks’. The appeal judges agreed with both parties that Lindt's teddy shape was a complex sign but did not believe that the allegedly infringed sign (here: Haribo's gold bear) was the obvious, unforced, self-contained and distinctive title and thus the closest and most fitting description of the Lindt teddy shape. The judges explained that there were several additional levels of abstraction that separated the chocolate teddy shape from the Goldbär word mark.

Further, the overall impression conveyed by Lindt's teddy was not only based on its shape and gold colour wrapping, red ribbon and the imprint of ears, face and paws but also affected by the fact that Lindt's name and logo and the words ‘Lindt Teddy’ were prominently displayed on the teddy's stomach. In this context the court also referred to the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt's precedent in the Gold Bunnies dispute cases between Lindt and its competitor Riegelein (GRUR-RR 2012, 255), in which the Frankfurt court had found that that the shape and colour of the Gold Bunnies were of a lower level of distinctiveness than the respective word elements (‘Lindt’ versus ‘Riegelein’) displayed on the bunnies. Applying this guidance to the case at hand, the Cologne judges concluded that that consumers would regard the word element ‘Lindt-Teddy’ in particular as an indication of origin, bearing in mind that the ‘Lindt-Teddy’ was a seamless addition to Lindt's established Gold Bunny product line. The court thus disagreed with Haribo's view that Lindt had taken unfair advantage of Haribo's Goldbär by ‘approximating’ its Lindt teddy to Haribo's gold bears in order to exploit the expectations of quality that consumers associate with Haribo's bears. The judges further explained this by pointing out that Lindt was a well-known confectionery manufacturer and the allegedly infringing Lindt Teddy product an obvious addition to Lindt's product line of gold-foiled chocolate shapes.

Practical significance

Whether the guidance developed by the Bundesgerichtshof for conflicts between word and device marks (similarity, where the later mark is an ‘obvious, unforced and exhaustive description’ of the earlier mark) may equally be applied to conflicts between word marks and three-dimensional shapes is a crucial one, bearing in mind the impact this can have on search strategies and advice when it comes to clearing any category of (shape) trade mark (or designs) for use and registration in Germany. In its closing remarks the Higher Regional Court of Cologne stated that the question of such a ‘cross collision’ (Überkreuzkollision) of trade marks was indeed of a ‘fundamental nature’. It is now expected that Haribo will appeal the matter to the Bundesgerichtshof, which may in turn even refer the question to the Court of Justice of the European Union for pan-European guidance.

Illegal download of a cinematographic work in a different language version

Author: Thomas Jochheim (Klinkert Zindel, Partner)

Higher Regional Court of Cologne, file no 6 W 255/12, 1 February 2013; Higher Regional Court of Cologne, file no 6 W 254/12, 23 September 2013

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2014) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpu051, first published online: April 10, 2014

The granting of rights regarding the German-language version of a cinematographic work may entitle the licensee to take legal action against the illegal download of another language version of that work in Germany.

Legal context

According to German law, a copyright is not transferable, unless it is transferred in execution of a testamentary disposition. The author may grant a right to another person to use the work in a particular manner or in any manner (exploitation right). An exploitation right may be granted as a non-exclusive right or as an exclusive right, and may be limited in respect of place, time and content.

A non-exclusive exploitation right entitles the licensee to use the work in the manner permitted to him. An exclusive exploitation right also entitles the licensee to use the work in the manner permitted to him, but to the exclusion of all other persons, including the licensor. As a matter of fact, the exclusive licensee not only has a ‘positive right’ to use the work, but also a ‘negative right’ of prohibition. He is therefore entitled to take legal actions to assert his claims against infringements as stipulated in s 97 of the German Copyright Act (‘Any person who infringes copyright or any other right protected under this Act may be required by the injured party to eliminate the infringement or, where there is a risk of repeated infringement, may be required by the injured party to cease and desist’).

It is moreover recognized within Germany that the scope of protection of exclusive exploitation rights can be broader than the positive right conferred by them. In a decision of 1999 for instance, the German Supreme Court (Laras Tochter, file no I ZR 65/96—29 April 1999) stated that the right holder of the exclusive exploitation right to reproduce and disseminate a literary work was entitled to prohibit the reproduction and dissemination of an adaptation of that work, even though he was not himself entitled to use the work in this manner.

Facts

In 2013, the Higher Regional Court of Cologne had to decide on two matters regarding illegal downloads of a movie in several foreign-language versions (the ‘Higher Regional Court of Cologne, file no 6 W 255/12, 1 February 2013’) and in the Russian language-version (the ‘Higher Regional Court of Cologne, file no 6 W254/12, 23 September 2013’) via a peer-to-peer network in Germany.

In both cases, the plaintiffs were the licensees of the exclusive exploitation rights of a movie in Germany, including the original English-language version as well as the German version. However, in the first case, the plaintiff′s licence agreement included an additional clause stating that the licensor was not entitled to exploit any language versions other than those licensed to the plaintiff in Germany.

The plaintiffs asserted their claim for disclosure. The request was granted in the first case and denied in the second one.

The Cologne Higher Regional Court stated in both cases that the exclusive exploitation right encompasses a negative right of prohibition, as stipulated in s 97 of the Germany Copyright Act. The court agreed that the claim for disclosure was an auxiliary claim linked to the right of prohibition (s 97 of the Germany Copyright Act). It therefore appeared necessary to make the claim for disclosure dependent on the condition that s 97 of the Germany Copyright Act was fulfilled.

The court further agreed that in order to ensure effective protection, the right of prohibition may be broader than the right holder′s positive right of use. A right holder may therefore be entitled to prohibit a certain use, if that use has an economic impact on its positive rights of use.

As a result, the court found that the plaintiff in the first case had the right to prohibit the foreign-language versions. In particular, it plaintiff referred to the additional clause in the licence agreement and stated that the scope of this clause was to enable the exhaustive and best possible exploitation of that movie in Germany. This scope would, however, be significantly impaired, if people downloaded the movie illegally, especially in foreign-language versions that were widespread in Germany, instead of buying it.

However, in the second case the court denied the plaintiff's right to prohibit the Russian-language version in Germany. Although the plaintiff had the exclusive right to exploit the movie in English, German and also Flemish and Dutch, there was no basis to conclude that he could prohibit all other versions of the movie in Germany. To ensure this, he should have had added an appropriate clause to his licence agreement, but this had not happened.

Moreover, in the court's opinion, it was not evident that the Russian-language version of the movie had any economic impact on the plaintiff's rights. Even though about one million people in Germany have Russian roots, a significant percentage of those people were born in Germany and were unlikely to have a sufficient grasp of Russian to watch a movie in that language. For this reason alone, such people could not be considered interested in the Russian-language version, so the plaintiff's exclusive rights could not be affected by that part of the population. On the other hand, people based in Russian-speaking areas who were interested in the Russian-language version of the movie would not consider buying it in English, German, Flemish or Dutch.

Analysis

The court rightly concludes that the possibility to illegally download a movie in a language version other than the exclusively licensed language version may still have an economic impact on the positive rights of use of the specific right holder.

However, the denial of any economic impact in the second case is not fully convincing. Many people prefer to watch movies in their original version, particularly if this is the English one. Many cinemas offer both original and dubbed versions of foreign movies. Moreover, unlike in Germany or France, it is not common in Eastern Europe to dub all movies, so a significant percentage of the people there are accustomed to watching movies in English. It is therefore unclear why people from Russian-speaking countries would not be at least interested in the original language version of the movie in this case—which would have an economic impact on the plaintiff's rights.

Practical significance

The decisions demonstrate the importance of drafting licence agreements carefully. This applies all the more as s 31(5) of the German Copyright Act states that, if the types of exploitation are not specifically designated when an exploitation right is granted, the types of use to which the right extends shall be determined in accordance with the purpose envisaged by both parties to the contract. This also applies, among other things, to the questions of whether an exploitation right has in fact been granted, whether that right is exclusive or non-exclusive, and how far the exploitation right and the right of prohibition extend. As a result, if not specifically stated otherwise in the agreement, copyright tends to remain with the author.

Third-party liability for information claims in trade mark infringement cases

Author: Anthonia Ghalamkarizadeh (Hogan Lovells)

Davidoff Hot Water”, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court), I ZR 51/12, 17 October 2013

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2013) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpt228, first published online: December 23, 2013

The German Federal Supreme Court referred questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the scope of information claims a trade mark owner can invoke against third parties in cases of alleged trade mark infringement.

Legal context

Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (‘the Enforcement Directive’) provides in Article 8(1) that Member States in their national legislation shall ensure that right owners can enforce information claims not only against the alleged infringer but also against certain third parties with commercial connections to the infringement. This includes persons who were found to have provided on a commercial scale services used in the infringing activities. In Germany, the corresponding right to request information from third parties has been implemented by Article 19(2)(1) No 3 of the German Trade Mark Act (MarkenG).

Article 8(3) of the Enforcement Directive regulates the relationship between the provisions of the Enforcement Directive and other statutory provisions dealing with information claims. Paragraph 3(e) provides that the entitlements under Article 8 ‘shall apply without prejudice to other statutory provisions which govern the protection of confidentiality of information sources or the processing of personal data’. Paragraph 383 of the German Court of Civil Procedure (ZPO) is such a statutory provision. It allows witnesses to refuse testimony for various reasons of a personal or professional nature. Witnesses such as medics, lawyers and bankers may rely on this exemption if, in exercising their profession, they have been entrusted with information that is confidential by nature or by law.

The German Federal Supreme Court had to decide on the order of precedence among the right to information and the right to refuse testimony for professional reasons.

Facts

The claimant had purchased a fragrance called ‘Davidoff Hot Water’ on the online marketplace eBay, transferring the purchase price to an account at a local savings bank. After discovering that the product was a counterfeit, the claimant tried to unveil the identity of the seller. Having exhausted other sources of information, the claimant brought an information claim against the savings bank, seeking to obtain the personal data of the account holder. The court at first instance granted the information order, but at second instance the action was dismissed. The claimant appealed on points of law to the German Federal Supreme Court.

Analysis

The German Supreme Court considered the sale of the product ‘Davidoff Hot Water’ to constitute an obvious case of trade mark infringement. Under the German rules on third-party liability for information claims, Article 19(2)(1) No 3 MarkenG, the savings bank would generally be liable for revealing the requested personal information about its customer. It had provided a commercial service to the alleged infringer which had been used in the course of the infringing acts. Against this obligation, the defendant savings bank invoked its right to refuse testimony under para 383 ZPO, relying on its confidentiality obligations in banking matters. The German rules on information claims against third parties in trade mark infringement cases are based on the Enforcement Directive and accordingly must be interpreted in the light of European Community law. The German Supreme Court therefore referred the question to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) whether in the present conflict the interests of the trade mark owner override the confidentiality obligations of the defendant savings bank—which is the preliminary view of the German court.

Practical significance

The CJEU's decision will further define the scope of trade mark owners' rights vis-à-vis third parties which are not otherwise responsible for the trade mark infringement. Should the CJEU concur with the German court that the interests of trade mark owners prevail over banking secrecy, this may be the starting point of further debate. Would other persons who, under the national rules of Member States, are exempt from testifying, such as doctors or lawyers, also be obliged to disclose confidential information? It will be difficult to draw clear boundaries in this intersection of competing interests. The likely outcome is a flexible approach, allowing for an individual balancing of rights and interests in each individual case of infringement and leaving it to national courts to shape the case law.

E-books distinguished from software, not exhausted

Author: Emma Linklater (European University Institute, Florence)

Case No 4 O 191/11, Landgericht (German Regional Court) Bielefeld, 5 March 2013

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2013), doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpt124, first published online: July 23, 2013

According to the German Regional Court of Bielefeld, the Court of Justice of the European Union's (CJEU's) UsedSoft decision is not applicable to the resale of other digital content, and contractual provisions restricting use, insofar as they prohibit resale of downloaded e-books and audio books, do not place a disproportionate disadvantage on consumers.

Legal context

German and EU copyright provisions

Article 4(2) of the Information Society (InfoSoc) Directive provides for the exhaustion of the copyright holder's distribution right and is implemented by s 17(2) of the German Copyright Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz; UrhG). Although the UrhG makes no distinction between tangibles and intangibles, the InfoSoc Directive's Recital 29 does, expressly rejecting the exhaustion of ‘services, and online services in particular’.

On 3 July 2012, the CJEU responded to a preliminary reference in Case C-128/11 Usedsoft v Oracle relating to this issue in the context of digitally downloaded software. In this case, the CJEU found the specific Software Directive to be the applicable legal instrument, overriding the more general InfoSoc Directive.

Article 4(1) of the Software Directive gives rights holders the exclusive right to authorize reproduction, adaptation and distribution to the public. Article 4(2) provides that upon first sale of a copy of a computer program in the Community, the distribution right is exhausted. Article 5(1) stipulates that no authorization by the rights holder is required for reproduction or adaptation of the program where necessary for use by the lawful acquirer in accordance with its intended purpose. The CJEU held that the distribution right could be exhausted where the copyright holder has authorized a download of software via the internet, and that a second or subsequent acquirer could become a ‘lawful acquirer’. The provision of Article 5(1) enabled that lawful acquirer to make a copy of the file, without infringing the rights holder's reproduction right.

German contract law

Under s 307(1) of the German Civil Code, contract terms must not unreasonably disadvantage consumers contrary to the requirement of good faith. Under s 307(2)(II), an unreasonable disadvantage is presumed to exist if the contract limits the essential rights inherent in the nature of the contract to such an extent that attainment of the purpose of the contract is jeopardized.

Facts

The defendant, an unnamed retailer, operates a website selling media in both physical and intangible (downloadable e-book and audio book) formats. Article 10(3) of the terms and conditions for sale provided that ‘the customer acquires the simple, non-transferable right to use the title offered for personal use only’. Additionally, the consumer's ability to copy, modify, transfer, make publically available, resell or use the download for commercial purposes was restricted.

The applicant, a German ‘umbrella’ consumer organization (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband; VZBZ), alleged that the contract clauses restricting use unreasonably disadvantaged consumers. The placement of e-books and audiobooks on the website and the use of ‘physical goods’ language employed would lead consumers to download them in good faith that they would have the same usage rights as for print books or CDs. Further, the contract terms went against the exhaustion principle set out in s 17(2) UrhG. Relying on UsedSoft, the applicant submitted that exhaustion should apply to both tangibles and intangibles alike, the decisive factor being that the contract concerns a marketable, tradable commodity.

Analysis

The court dismissed the action as unfounded. Looking first at the consumer contract at issue, the court found that the primary purpose of the contract with the defendant was to enable the consumer to ‘use’ the desired content; the defendant is therefore only contractually responsible for facilitating the download so that the content can be stored on the consumer's local disk to be accessed at will. Thus, from a contractual perspective, the contract's purpose is not endangered by limiting further sale or use. From the consumer's perspective, the court reasoned that, because consumers know about the piracy problem and since digital copies do not degrade with use, they expect that they will not be allowed to pass on their copies and anticipate that all they will get from the contract is the ability to download the content and the right to its personal use. According to the court, the terms are clear and precise so as not to mislead the consumer into thinking that he is getting a right that can be assimilated to a property right in a physical object.

In this case, the defendant's interest in preventing an uncontrollable and potentially infringing secondary market outweighed the consumer interest in establishing such a market. Since digital files can be transmitted instantly, without loss of quality, there is a strong economic risk for the defendant. However, no forward-and-delete technologies (as employed by Usedsoft or Redigi) were mentioned in this case. Accordingly, the consumer interest here was in accessing the download and in attaining a copy to read or listen to at will—not in being able to sell the file. Further, due to the lower price of downloadable e-books and audio books, ‘the average consumer’ should be satisfied with having the file for personal use.

Moving to the exhaustion issue, the court reiterated that Community exhaustion applies to the distribution right. The downloading of the file, however, creates a local copy and is therefore an act of reproduction. For a downloaded file to be legally resold, a further copy must be made; the distribution right must be exhausted, but also the acquirer must have the right to reproduce a copy to enable use. Referring to Usedsoft, it emphasized that the conclusions in that case were specific to the Software Directive because, through Article 5(1), reproduction without authorization is possible where necessary for use of by the lawful acquirer. In UsedSoft, the CJEU did not provide for the exhaustion of the reproduction right itself, but it was the combination of exhaustion of the distribution right and Article 5(1) which enabled resale of the downloaded software. The InfoSoc Directive, on the other hand, does not provide for such scenarios. Without an equivalent of Article 5(1), even if the distribution right could be exhausted the necessity of producing a reproduction copy to use the downloaded e-book or audio book would be an infringement.

Lastly, the court found that prohibiting copying by a third party or resale of the e-book or audio book file does not depart from the essential spirit of s 44a para 1 UrhG. The download and duplication here were intended and did not arise ‘incidentally during a technological process’.

Practical significance

One practical element—if not from a copyright perspective then from a business one—is the acceptance by the court that a lower price equals fewer rights, and that this is acceptable from a consumer perspective. This may be a relief to the publishing industry, but also contains a warning that for restrictions to personal use only to be warranted, there needs to be a consumer benefit in the form of increased accessibility through affordability.

Unfortunately, the significance of this decision is also limited by the lack of any reference to forward-and-delete technologies, which were seemingly not on the court's horizon. This limits the scope of the court's finding that the interest in preserving the rights holders' monopoly outweighs the consumer interest in allowing resale, since with such technologies, the rights holders’ interests can be preserved without an impact on piracy (ie one that one user's copy will be re-circulated). Further questions may be raised on appeal about the ‘reasonable consumer’ approach adopted: To assume that all consumers are aware of the contractual limitations of their downloaded content likely paints a simplified picture, since the growing number of business models promoting lending, sharing and cross-platform access have created a hazy grey-zone where ‘personal use’ is starting to be less clear.

Undoubtedly, the real significance of this decision comes more from its topicality than its substance. It essentially upholds the status quo; however, with the applicants set to appeal and against the backdrop of Redigi (see Case No 4 O 191/11, Landgericht [German Regional Court] Bielefeld, 5 March 2013] in the USA and the recent patents for ‘forward-and-delete’ technologies granted to tech giants Amazon and Apple, the issue of digital exhaustion does not look likely to go away this easily. Although there is little way that a regional court would have found UsedSoft to apply outside the (limited) context of the Software Directive, a judgment such as this making its way through the European legal system (again bearing in mind the music industry equivalent in the USA) could signal alarm bells in the minds of policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic. Although politicians have seemingly opted to keep silent on this issue for the moment, they are unlikely to be able to do so for long.

The German ‘Google Tax’ law: groovy or greedy?

Author: Eleonora Rosati

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2013) 8 (7): 497. doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpt086

On 22 March 2013, after passing the Bundestag, the German Bundesrat approved a piece of legislation known as Leistungsschutzrecht für Presseverlege (LSR). The act extended press publishers' copyright by providing them with an ancillary right over news contents.

Google Tax: backed
by her coalition
This piece of legislation, which has come to be known in jargon as the ‘Google Tax’ law, was backed by Chancellor Merkel's ruling coalition and is intended to recoup some of the revenues traditional news publishers have lost to the web. According to two studies by the Iowa University and ETH and Boston University respectively, not only are news aggregators unlikely to have complementary effects on the number of visits received by newspapers' homepages, but rather appear to have a substitution effect, which is said to have contributed to declining online traffic in the past few years.

The newly created sections 87f, 87g and 87h of the Urheberrechtsgesetz shall provide for the exclusive right of press publishers to exploit their contents commercially for one year, thus preventing search engines and news aggregators from displaying excerpts from newspaper articles without paying a fee.

Shortly prior to its approval, the text of the bill was amended to the effect that—contrary to the original proposal—no fees will have to be paid for displaying single words or short-text snippets. However, the text approved by the German parliament does not clarify the length required to fall within this exemption. While texts shorter than a headline might be thought to qualify, uncertainty over this point might result in litigation ensuing before the German courts.

Besides considerations pertaining to the possible impact of the LSR on fundamental rights such as freedom of information, it is apparent that this law might also set an important precedent elsewhere in Europe (to say the least).

It is worth recalling that a few months ago France was also considering adopting a bill that would require payment of a fee for displaying links to and snippets of newspaper articles. Eventually, similarly to what happened in Belgium, no such law was adopted, as Google and local newspaper publishers reached an agreement that, while exempting Google from paying fees for displaying content on its News service, provided for the creation of a fund to support transformative digital publishing initiatives in France.

In any case, discussion on whether and how the display of third parties' content over aggregators and search engines should be subject to the payment of a fee is far from settled. At the moment, the possible models for regulating these activities in Europe appear to be the German legislative approach and the conclusion of private agreements between interested parties.

A solution like the German one might have the advantage of providing a general legislative framework. While this might contribute to reducing—among other things—transaction costs, it is not be excluded that this might also have anti-competitive effects, eg raising barriers to entry for smaller players and start-ups, thus contributing to consolidating the market position of established players like Google.

Although the LSR (in compliance with earlier case law) does not expressly prohibit mere linking, from a broader EU perspective the provision of a new ancillary right for press publishers might have worrisome implications, especially considering that the Court of Justice of the European Union has been asked to clarify, inter alia, whether a clickable link might constitute a communication to the public as per Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC. The forthcoming decision in Case C-466/12 Svensson (a reference from the Svea hovrätt) has the potential to have a profound impact on the way the internet functions. One of the questions referred by the Swedish court is indeed whether it is possible for a Member State to give broader protection to authors' exclusive rights by enabling ‘communication to the public’ to cover a greater range of acts than provided for in Article 3(1). Should the answer to this question be in the affirmative, then the provision of an ancillary right for press publishers would indeed appear a mild solution, if compared to the possibility for Member States to provide press publishers with actual copyright protection against use of their contents by news aggregators and alike. Should this happen, then not only media pluralism would be affected, but innovative services would be prevented from continuing to exist or even emerge. Hence, it appears that the LSR is not only a bad idea for the sake of copyright health, but looks indeed to be aimed at safeguarding certain outdated models to the detriment of breakthrough services and business solutions.

Gold Bear Wars

Author: Birgit Clark (Baker & McKenzie LLP)

Regional Court of Cologne (Landgericht Köln), 33O 803/11, 18 December 2012

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2013) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpt072, first published online: May 31, 2013

Upholding a claim brought by confectionery manufacturer Haribo, the Regional Court of Cologne decided that competitor Lindt's three-dimensional gold-foiled chocolate bears amounted to an infringing ‘visual representation’ of Haribo's well-known GOLDBÄREN gummy bear word marks.

Legal context

In accordance with Article 5(1) of the European Union's Trade Mark Directive, Article 14(2) No 3 of the German Trade Mark Act (MarkenG) provides that it constitutes trade mark infringement ‘if a third party without having consent of the trade mark owner in the course of trade exploits the distinctive character or the repute of a well-known trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered without due cause and by such use takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark’.

Facts

German confectioners Haribo had sold its multi-coloured gummy bears wrapped in gold-coloured packaging since the 1960s and owned various registered trade mark rights relating to them including, inter alia, GOLDBÄR (in English: gold bear) and its plural form GOLDBÄREN as well as its ‘Goldbär device’: a yellow-gold coloured bear device wearing a red ribbon bow covering confectionery. Haribo's competitor, Swiss confectioner Lindt, who produces the well-known chocolate Gold Bunnies, has made and sold gold-foil wrapped chocolate bears (called Lindt Teddy and wearing a red ribbon bow) since 2011. Haribo took objection and brought a claim against the distribution of Lindt's chocolate bears in Germany based on its trade mark rights. In addition, Haribo asked for information, damages and the destruction of Lindt's products. Lindt saw things differently and contended that the gold foil and red ribbon used on its chocolate Lindt Teddies were the same as those used on its well-known Easter chocolate Gold Bunnies. Lindt explained that it had intentionally refrained from using brand names such as ‘Goldbär’ or ‘Gold Teddy’ and that gold was a traditional Christmas colour. The Swiss chocolate maker thus invited the court to find that the competing products did not look in any way similar so that consumers would not be confused.

Analysis

The court agreed with Haribo. While Haribo based its infringement claim on a likelihood of confusion (Article 14(2) No 2 MarkenG), dilution (Article 14(2) No 3 MarkenG) as well as unfair competition law, the court chose to focus solely on trade mark dilution.

The court confirmed that Haribo's trade mark registration for GOLDBÄREN amounted to a well-known mark in the sense of Article 14(2) No 3 MarkenG insofar as it covered fruit gum, being known to over 90 per cent of the relevant German consumers as evidenced by a market survey Haribo submitted in support of its claim. While it acknowledged that Lindt did not use the word sign GOLDBÄREN for its products, the court nonetheless found that Lindt's Teddies amounted to a ‘visual representation’ of and were thus of a ‘high similarity’ to Haribo's trade marks. The court explained that the sight of the shape of Lindt's three-dimensional chocolate bears inevitably produced connotations with Haribo's bears as being protected by its various trade mark registrations.

The court further agreed with Haribo that consumers were likely to refer to Lindt's bears as ‘Goldbären’ due to their visual appearance which could in turn result in a dilution of Haribo's trade mark rights under Article 14(2) No 3. MarkenG Lindt had claimed that its bear had been named the Lindt Teddy as an intentional variation of its well-known gold foil wrapped bunny. In this respect, the court took the view that the majority of consumers would not use terms such as ‘gold bear figure’, ‘bear wrapped in gold foil’ or ‘gold-coloured chocolate teddy bear’ but would pick the closest and most obvious term when describing Lindt's bears, which was ‘Goldbär’. While ‘Goldbär’ was not a term that could be found in a dictionary, it was nonetheless the most obvious term to describe Lindt's bears, not least due to the fame of Haribo's trade mark.

Noting the significance of the legal issues raised, the court allowed an appeal to the Higher Regional Court of Cologne, explaining that this was a special case since there had so far been no decision by the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) on the question of a conflict between a word mark and a three-dimensional product design. The Cologne court did, however, stress that there could be a similarity between different ‘categories of trade marks’ and applied legal principles which the Bundesgerichtshof had previously developed in precedents concerning a conflict between word marks and figurative trade marks (BGH GRUR 1971, 251, 252—Oldtimer; BGH GRUR 2004, 779, 783 Zwilling/Zweibrüder). The judges pointed out that the Bundesgerichtshof had held that there could be similarity where there was not only a ‘concordance in theme’ but where a term was the ‘obvious, unforced and exhaustive description’ adopted by consumers. To avoid a general protection of a mere theme (‘kein allgemeiner Motivschutz’) the threshold for trade mark infringement had to be set high and be restricted to signs that had a ‘particularly memorable and distinctive’ meaning. In cases of three-dimensional marks this would only apply in rare cases, the Cologne judges concluded. In this context the judges also agreed with Haribo that Lindt's gold-coloured packaging could lead consumers to make a mental connection since Haribo's packaging also featured a gold bear wearing a red ribbon.

Lindt's use of its Teddy was also use of the GOLDBÄREN trade mark insofar as it was used as an indicator of trade origin. The court pointed out that Lindt itself had argued that the Teddy was meant as a logical extension of the Gold Bunny product line and was thus meant to refer to the defendant's business.

Lindt's three-dimensional shape and packaging of its Teddy was also ‘unfair’ in the sense of Article 14(2) No 3 MarkenG since there was a serious and real danger that it could dilute the distinctive character of Haribo's mark. Not only would the strength of Haribo's mark as an indicator of origin be reduced, but there was a genuine risk that the mark GOLDBÄREN could become a generic term. The court did not accept the argument that the term GOLDBÄREN was purely descriptive for chocolate products and that their chocolate bears were high priced premium chocolate, whereas Haribo sold ‘low priced sweet nibbles in plastic bags’. Conceding that there may be other gold foil-wrapped chocolate bears available on the German market the judges nonetheless considered that consumers would not automatically describe these as ‘Goldbär’. Further, the relevant market could not be compartmentalized into a market for fruit gums and a market for chocolate since that there was a homogenous market for sweets. Indeed, both the defendant's and the claimant's products were sold in close proximity in supermarket shelves.

The imprint ‘A Teddy’ on some of Lindt's bear did not remove the serious and real danger of a dilution of Haribo's trade mark. Even if an observant consumer would notice the imprint, this would not remove the risk of an association of both marks in the mind of consumer, who could be led to believe that there were contractual connections between defendant and claimant or that Lindt's Teddy was a co-operation of two different manufacturers of confectionery, in particular since Haribo had recently introduced fruit gum products that were a cooperation with another chocolate maker. Accordingly, in light of the (potential) damage to Haribo's trade mark rights it was proportionate for Lindt to pay damages, recall and destroy all products as demanded by Haribo.

Practical significance

The question of conceptual similarity is not always straightforward, as this case illustrates. While it has long been acknowledged that word and figurative marks can be similar, the question of similarity between a word mark and a three-dimensional shape mark appears to arise less frequently. In order to maintain legal certainty for trade mark owners and their competitors alike, it seems crucial that there is a high threshold—as rightly demanded by the Cologne court—and clear guidance as to when similarity may arise.

It is not easy to determine whether the guidance developed by the Bundesgerichtshof for conflicts between word and device marks (similarity, where the later mark is an ‘obvious, unforced and exhaustive description’ of the earlier mark) should equally be applied to all conflicts between word marks and three-dimensional shapes or whether it should be limited to cases where the earlier mark is well-known—as it was the case here with Haribo's mark. Bearing in mind the impact this point may have on search strategies and advice when it comes to clearing any category of (shape) trade mark—and potentially also designs—for use and registration in Germany, it is good news that Lindt has already announced that it will appeal the decision. It thus appears safe to predict that it may only be a question of time until we have a Bundesgerichtshof decision on this issue.

Terminus appeal hits the buffers

Earlier this year, JIPLP published a Current Intelligence note by Thorsten Lauterbach, "Copyright: A narrow defeat is still a defeat: integrity clipped before its best-before date" (Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2011) 6(6): 371-373; doi:10.1093/jiplp/jpr024). According to the abstract:
"The Stuttgart Higher Regional Court in Germany, balancing the right of integrity under copyright attributed to the architect of a work of architecture and the right to property held by the owner of the building, recently found against the grandson of Paul Bonatz, the architect of the Stuttgart terminus rail station and in favour of Deutsche Bahn AG, which sought to demolish part of that station during the construction of a new underground station.".
Thorsten has just informed us of the latest news in this dispute:
"You may recall my short comment on the author’s rights dispute revolving around the Stuttgart terminus station. Well, on 9 November the last word has now been spoken by the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof).

The Stuttgart 21 project (turning the railway terminus into an underground through station) had led to an author’s rights dispute between the owner of the terminus station and buildings, Deutsche Bahn AG, and the grandson of Paul Bonatz, one of the author-architects of the terminus building. The project required the destruction of both side wings of the terminus, as well as the grand staircase leading to the station hall. The author’s grandson, Peter Dübbers, sought to protect the author personality rights of his grandfather which he regarded as violated by the partial destruction of the original building. The remedies he pursued with this action were reconstruction of the north-west wing, and cessation of the imminent destruction of the south-east wing and the grand staircase (for a more detailed treatment of the legal arguments, see my earlier Current Intelligence note). 
Having lost in both instances, the last throw of the dice was an appeal against denial of leave to appeal (Nichtzulassungsbeschwerde) before the Federal Court, since the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) had refused leave to appeal. 
On 9 November the Federal Court confirmed the decision by the Higher Regional Court and dismissed the appeal by Mr Dübbers. An appeal to the Federal Court would only have been in order if the legal issue was of fundamental significance, or if a decision was necessary in order to develop or ensure consistency of the law. The decision of the lower court was regarded as free from errors of law; in addition, it did not raise issues which had not been dealt with sufficiently by prior Federal Court jurisprudence. Accordingly Mr Dübbers’s case was without legal foundation. In Dübbers’ view the case did indeed raise a fundamental legal issue, namely in respect of the significance – and arguably the gradual lessening the value – of author’s personality rights. However, the Federal Court did not agree. 
This brings an end to the legal action. It follows the political decision taken by the people of Baden-Württemberg on 27 November in a rare referendum to continue with this polarising project".
Addendum: Thorsten has now provided a link to the decision (Az. I ZR 216/10, in German) of the Federal Court, which you can read here.  If you prefer it, there is also a shorter press notice (No. 186/11, also in German) here.

Euro-injunction mechanism in Community designs: Samsung Galaxy Tab European ban partially lifted

Author: Séverine Mas, avocate

Apple Inc. v Samsung Electronics GmbH and Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd, Düsseldorf Tribunal of first instance (Landgericht), Germany, Press Release No 013/2011 of 9 September 2011 concerning case No 14 c O 194/11

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2011) doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpr181, first published online: November 23, 2011

The 14th Civil Division of the Düsseldorf Tribunal of first instance confirmed an interim decision preventing the German firm Samsung Electronics GmbH from selling the Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 in the whole of the European Union, on account of a potential infringement of a Community design registered by Apple. The ban was, however, restricted to the German territory for sales by Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd, based in South Korea.

Legal context

The court examined its authority to grant a European injunction in the case of a Community design infringement, in application of Articles 82 and 83 of the Community Designs Regulation (EC Regulation 6/2002), following two interim decisions rendered on 9 and 16 August by the same court.

Facts

In a preliminary injunction (9 August 2011), the Düsseldorf court of first instance prohibited the sale, import, export, and interim storage of the Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 in the whole of the EU except in the Netherlands, on the grounds that it potentially infringes Apple's Community design rights (Community design 000181607 for the iPad product).

However, the President of the Düsseldorf court announced on 16 August that execution of that decision was suspended. The announcement stated that the court did not have jurisdiction to grant a European-wide injunction forbidding a company based outside the European Union to commercialize its products in the EU. The ground stated for the suspension was that the court was asked to examine an interim matter and thus did not have such far-reaching powers.

The decision for the appeal filed by Samsung against the 9 August injunction, following the court hearing of 25 August, was rendered on 9 September.

The Landgericht maintained the injunction against Samsung Electronics GmbH, a German company, confirming the prohibition of selling the Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 in the EU, and in particular, the prohibition of producing, offering for sale, commercializing, importing, exporting, or storing the product for these purposes.

With regard to Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd, based in South Korea, the court has, however, limited the ban to the German territory. The European-wide ban was lifted.

Analysis

Competition is fierce in the tablet PC market, and registrations of IP rights are some means of obtaining a competitive advantage. The current context is part of a legal strategy between Apple products and Android-based smartphones and tablet PCs (Android is an open-source operating system created by Google, used by several manufacturers including Samsung).

The mechanism of the European injunction in favour of Community design owners allows Community design courts to prohibit the sale of a product potentially infringing a Community design, in the whole European Union territory, without examining the grounds for the claims (ie the validity of the design registered). As the German decision has not yet been published, we assume that the injunction was based on Article 85 of the Community Designs Regulation. The Regulation on Community designs requires that in proceedings for an alleged infringement action, the courts treat the Community design as valid (Article 85 of the Regulation). Validity can only be challenged through a counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity, or by way of counterclaim in so far as the defendant claims that the Community design could be declared invalid on account of an earlier national design right belonging to the defendant.

The Düsseldorf Landgericht's summary judgment of 9 August is an exceptional decision, given its scope and potential consequences. We should, however, bear in mind that the tribunal had no choice but to consider the design as valid. Acting on an interim matter, the court could not examine the grounds of the claims. It could only examine the existence of IP rights on which the claims were based.

This leads on to the validity of the Community design. Apple's registered Community design may be seen as so basic that the ‘individual character’ condition of Article 6 may be absent. In addition, the shape of the design can be considered being dictated by the functionality of a tablet PC (Figure 1).


Apple's registered design for a handheld computer

Design law requires that the form of a design not be solely dictated by its technical function (Article 8 of the Regulation). It is therefore questionable that a simple rectangular, flat geometric shape be registered as a Community design for a tablet PC. The shape in itself could be seen as being dictated by the functionality of the apparatus, which is to provide a tactile screen for interaction with the user.

In conclusion, it is possible that the design may be declared invalid in the future. The legal issue at stake would then fall under the realms of unfair competition rather than of industrial property rights.

Practical significance

A similar provision relating to trade marks allows national courts to grant Euro-injunctions in favour of trade mark owners (Article 98 of the Community Trade Mark Regulation). The extent of jurisdiction on Community design infringement depends on the international jurisdiction criteria stated in Article 82 of the Community Designs Regulation. Article 82(1) states that infringement proceedings
shall be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled or, if he is not domiciled in any of the Member States, in any Member State in which he has an establishment.
Article 85(2) states that if
the defendant is neither domiciled nor has an establishment in any of the Member States, such proceedings shall be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the plaintiff is domiciled or, if he is not domiciled in any of the Member States, in any Member State in which he has an establishment.
If the claimant or the defendant is domiciled or has an establishment in the Member State, the Community Design Court will have authority to grant a Euro-injunction based upon the Community Design Regulation, Article 83(1). If, however, the court is acting only so as to stop potential infringement in the Member State in which the act of infringement has been committed or is going to be committed—the forum loci delicti (Article 82(5))—it will not have the authority to grant a Euro-injunction (Article 83(2)).

In the present case, the defendants were Samsung Electronics GmbH (based near Frankfurt) and Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd (headquartered in South Korea). The reasoning behind the suspension of the execution of the original 9 August decision is that the court only had jurisdiction to grant a Euro-injunction towards Samsung's German defendant. With regard to Samsung Korea, the company is not viewed as an ‘establishment’ in the sense of the Regulation. This may be due to a problem of translation of the European Regulation into German. In the German version of the text, the term ‘establishment’ is translated as ‘Niederlassung’. This can mean either an independent company or a subsidiary.

In order for Article 82(1) to apply, Samsung Electronics GmbH would need to be considered a subsidiary of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd (South Korea). This seems not to be the case. Due to the plaintiff's headquarters being situated in California, Article 82(2) could not be applied either.

The appropriate form of action in order to obtain a Euro-injunction would have been for Apple Inc. to have applied to the courts of Alicante in Spain, where the OAMI is situated (Article 82(3)).

Industrial property offices have a great responsibility in maintaining a healthy market, by being cautious before granting industrial property rights. The combination of Articles 83 and 85 of the Community Design Regulation creates a powerful instrument for corporations. Aggressive registration of questionable designs followed by summary injunctions seeking a European ban is an effective technique for eliminating competition.

In the case of abusive procedures, there is little in the way of compensation for victims if the design is subsequently invalidated. This current state of affairs may limit healthy competition and place a brake on innovation in the European Community market.

No fairy tale ending for Neuschwanstein trade mark

Author: Birgit Clark (Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP)

German Federal Patent Court (Bundespatentgericht), case reference: 25 W (pat) 182/09, 4 February 2011

Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2011), doi: 10.1093/jiplp/jpr080, first published online: June 1, 2011

The German Federal Patent Court decided that the mark Neuschwanstein clearly and unambiguously referred to the famous castle of the same name and could not therefore be registered as a trade mark due to an inherent lack of distinctiveness regardless of the goods or services for which registration is sought.

Legal context

Like the corresponding provisions of the Community Trade Mark Regulation, §8(2) No. 1 of the German Trade Mark Act (MarkenG) provides that a trade mark which is devoid of any distinctive character shall not be registered. §8(2) No. 2 MarkenG stipulates that trade marks ‘which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of services, or other characteristics of goods or services’ will equally not qualify for registration. §50(1) MarkenG states that the registration of a trade mark may be declared invalid on the ground that the trade mark was registered in breach of §8 MarkenG. §50(2) MarkenG further stipulates that, where a trade mark was registered in breach of §8(2) No. 1 or No. 2 MarkenG, the mark may only be declared invalid provided the ground for refusal still exists at the point of the invalidity decision and provided that the application for invalidity was filed within ten years from the date of registration of the mark.

Facts

The famous German castle Neuschwanstein is one several castles and palaces that were commissioned by the ‘fairy tale king’ King Ludwig II of Bavaria in the mid-nineteenth century. Gracefully situated on a hill near the city of Füssen in Bavaria, neo-gothic Neuschwanstein was intended to be King Ludwig's personal refuge. Sadly, however, the king died under mysterious circumstances not long after the castle was completed. Neuschwanstein has since featured in various films and also famously inspired Disney's Sleeping Beauty Castle. With such a romantic history, it is no surprise that the castle has become a major tourist attraction, with more than 1.3 million people visiting the castle annually.

The Bavarian Castle Department, a division of the Bavarian state government, was concerned about the quality of the souvenir trade connected to the castle and, in an attempt to regulate the souvenir industry in 2005, registered the word mark Neuschwanstein at the German Patent and Trade Mark Office (DPMA) for a broad specification of goods and services in classes 4, 5, 15, 24–27, 29, 30, 32–34, 36, 38, 39, 43 and 44. The German Federal Association Bundesverband Souvenir Geschenke Ehrenpreise e.V. (BSGE), a trade network of souvenir producers, wholesalers, and retailers objected to this registration and filed an invalidity application against the mark at the DPMA, inter alia, arguing that the trade mark was akin to ‘censorship’ of the Neuschwanstein souvenir trade.

Analysis

The DPMA decided in the BSGE's favour and cancelled the mark, holding that the mark Neuschwanstein was a commonly used, non-distinctive term which was incapable of indicating the trade origin of the goods and services marketed under the sign, §8(2) No. 1 German Trade Marks Act (MarkenG). Neuschwanstein was not only a symbol for stylish ambience but was also part of Bavaria's cultural heritage. In view of the DPMA, consumers would therefore regard the mark Neuschwanstein as a mere advertising message and see it as a clear reference to the world famous castle.

Upon appeal by the Bavarian Castle Department, the 25th Senate of the German Federal Patent Court upheld the DPMA's decision, deciding that the term Neuschwanstein clearly and unambiguously referred to the castle of the same name and could consequently not be registered as a trade mark due to a lack of distinctiveness under §8(2) No. 1 MarkenG regardless of the goods or services for which registration was sought. The Court added that the mark was also descriptive of some of the goods and services covered under §8(2) No. 2 MarkenG.

In its decision of 4 February 2011, the Court first assessed descriptiveness of the mark under §8(2) No. 2 MarkenG. With regard to services such as ‘travel services; catering/hospitality services and accommodation services’, the Court found that the average consumer would interpret the mark Neuschwanstein as descriptive of the characteristics of the services rendered, their intended purpose as well as their geographical origin. The Court explained that it was the particular purpose that provision to exclude descriptive signs from trade mark protection since their monopolization was contrary to the justified interest of the general public to be able to use descriptive terms freely. The Court stressed that a potential effect on the freedom to compete was enough in this regard, provided it was reasonable to assume that the mark would be seen as descriptive by the normally informed and attentive consumer in the future. The Court found that the sign Neuschwanstein ‘unambiguously and exclusively’ referred to the castle of the same name. The Court considered that ‘travel services; catering services and accommodation services’ were services that targeted the average consumer, being typically rendered in connection with the visit of a tourist attraction because visitors had to travel to get to the castle and would often eat and/or stay in a nearby hotel. Consequently, the mark Neuschwanstein would be regarded as directly descriptive of such services that were rendered near or in connection with Neuschwanstein castle.

Turning to the question of distinctiveness, the Court held that Neuschwanstein also lacked the necessary distinctiveness under §8(2) No. 1 MarkenG to qualify for trade mark registration. The Court stressed that names of famous tourist attractions, such as Neuschwanstein, were not only non-distinctive for goods and services that are usually offered in the proximity or in the context of a tourist attraction but for all possible goods and services. Moreover, even marks that did not directly refer to the goods and services covered could nonetheless be non-distinctive provided there was a close descriptive connection between the mark and the actual product. Furthermore, the judges explained that commonly used words or idioms of the German language could also be non-distinctive in this sense and so be unsuitable to serve as indication of trade origin, even if they did not directly describe a product, provided that they were usually understood in this way; for example, due to use in the media or in advertisements. Like high-profile events, such as the Football World Cup, the names of famous buildings should equally not be monopolized.

The judges emphasized that Neuschwanstein was not only a major tourist attraction with over 1.3 million visitors per year but also a world famous landmark of particular cultural, political, and historical importance: such cultural sights, being part of the world cultural heritage, were common property belonging to the general public and, like the names of famous historical personalities, should also not be monopolized or commercialized by trade mark laws. Moreover, consumers would not interpret this name as a reference to a particular trade source or a specific undertaking but would always regard it as a reference to the castle. This assessment was not affected by the question of actual ownership of the building.

Applying these guidelines, the Court found Neuschwanstein was non-distinctive not only for goods and services that were typically rendered in close proximity of a tourist attractions (such as souvenirs, clothing, tobacco), products that were often additionally consumed by tourists (such as pharmaceutical goods, coffee, confectionery, and other goods covered by classes 29, 30, 32, and 33), not to mention supplemental services which were often required by tourists (such as financial services, currency exchange, and transport services) but also for those goods and services that that were not usually rendered in close context to a tourist sight (such as carpets, insurance services, real estate services).

All the same, the judges acknowledged that, in order not to overly limit the availability of names of famous buildings as trade marks, this approach had to be applied strictly and must be limited to buildings that were cultural goods of outstanding importance. Whether this was the case had to be specifically determined in each individual case. Comparing Neuschwanstein with other famous sights, such as the Colosseum in Rome, the Taj Mahal, and the Eiffel tower, the Court concluded that Neuschwanstein was not only a globally known symbol of the German age of romanticism and a significant part of Germany's national cultural heritage but also of political and architectural importance so that its name could not be monopolized by one proprietor.

The Court dismissed the Bavarian Castle Department's argument that the sign Neuschwanstein could be used as a trade mark by affixing it to labels or directly on actual products ‘in a self evident way of practical significance’ to render it distinctive in a trade mark sense. Referring to precedents by the German Federal Supreme Court in the DDR-Logo (I ZR 92/08 of 14 January 2010), SWISS ARMY (I ZB 35/98 of 21 September 2000), and TOOOR! (I ZB 115/08 of 24 June 2010) cases, the Court stressed that a mark that inherently lacked distinctiveness could not achieve distinctiveness by simply affixing it to the packaging of goods. Allowing otherwise, the Court explained, would not only bereave Article 8(2) No. 1 and No. 2 MarkenG of all meaning but would also be contrary to European trade mark law. The judges stressed that any assessment of the distinctiveness and/or descriptiveness of a mark always had to be conducted in the abstract, solely with regard to the meaning of a mark in light of the goods and services covered but unrelated to its actual use on the goods.

Finally, the judges made short shrift with the Bavarian Castle Department's contention that comparable trade marks for the castles ‘BURG ELTZ’, ‘NYMPHENBURG’, ‘LINDERHOF’, and ‘SANSSOUCI’, stating that each case had to be judged on its own merits and that earlier registrations were not binding but could only ever have persuasive importance. In particular, the decision as to whether a trade mark was registrable was not open to discretion.

Given that several aspects of this decision were of fundamental importance, the Federal Patent Court permitted a further (partial) appeal to the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof).

Practical significance

According to German media reports, the Bavarian Castle Department was very disappointed by the cancellation of its Neuschwanstein trade mark, stressing that it was not ‘after the souvenir and snow globe traders’ but merely wanted to protect the Neuschwanstein brand from ‘crude abuse’. In the view of the Bavarian Castle Department certain products, such as schnapps or lingerie, ‘were not reconcilable with the dignity of the castle’. While this view is understandable, the Bavarian Castle Department does have further legal options to prevent abuse of the sign Neuschwanstein under German law. This was also expressly mentioned by the Court which pointed out that alternative routes, such as claims under name right provisions under §12 German Civil Code, under the law of delict under §826 German Civil Code as well as unfair competition law claims under §§1, 3 German Unfair Competition Act were not barred by this judgment.

Following the Federal Patent Court's Neuschwanstein decision, names of culturally important buildings and personalites will be more difficult to protect as German trade marks. It should be emphasized in this context that the Court decided that Neuschwanstein was not distinctive enough for trade mark registration per se unrelated to the goods and services covered. How this decision will affect other existing German trade mark registrations for famous buildings, such as the ones cited by the claimant in the case, is unclear, in particular if the German Federal Supreme Court were to confirm this decision on appeal.

World Cup trade mark dispute: 1-0 says the German Federal Supreme Court

Author: Birgit Clark (Boult Wade Tennant)

Citation: Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, doi:10.1093/jiplp/jpp205

German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), advance press release No. 232/2009, 13 November 2009 concerning case I ZR 183/07 (‘WM-Marken’), 12 November 2009

The German Federal Supreme Court had decided that FIFA, the organiser of the football World Cup, cannot prevent the economic exploitation of its sporting events through third party trade mark registrations relating to the World Cup or the third party use of these marks.

Legal context

The ‘general clause’ of section 3 of the German Act of Unfair Competition (UWG) prohibits unfair acts of competition which are liable to have more than an insubstantial impact on competition to the detriment of competitors, consumers, or other market participants. Section 4 No. 10 UWG renders it unlawful systematically to obstruct an individual competitor's freedom to act within the market.

‘Work titles’ (Werktitel) are any distinctive designation of an intangible result of work, such as the title of a book, and are protected under the German Trade Mark Act, mainly under the same terms as trade names and other business identifiers. In contrast to trade marks, work titles are protected without registration as soon as they are used in trade, subject only to the condition that they are inherently distinctive.

Facts

The International Federation of Association Football (FIFA), based in Switzerland, organizes the football World Cup and owns numerous (German) trade mark registrations relating to the football World Cup 2006, which was held in Germany, as well as trade marks relating to the upcoming World Cup to be held in South Africa later this year.

During past World Cup tournaments the defendant, sweets maker Ferrero GmbH had distributed free collectible stickers with its chocolate wafers that showed each member of the German national team together with a logo that combined a depiction of a football with a reference to the tournament, including the year it was held. In 2004 and 2005, the defendant registered eight word and device marks which referred to the World Cup and covered a broad range of classes. These marks included ‘WM 2010’, ‘WM’, and ‘2010’. The abbreviation WM was short for ‘Weltmeisterschaft’, the German word for World Cup. The defendant also applied to register three additional marks, including the mark ‘Südafrika 2010’ in reference to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa.

With its court action, FIFA sought to cancel Ferrero GmbH's World Cup trade mark registrations and to secure its agreement to a withdrawal of its pending applications arguing that the confectionery company had no rights to register the marks. FIFA, which controlled its World Cup franchise via its own collection company, claimed that Ferrero's trade mark registrations and applications infringed their earlier rights and constituted an infringement of German unfair competition law.

Analysis

The Court of First Instance, the Regional Court of Hamburg (case reference: 312 O 353/05 of 25 October 2005) decided in FIFA's favour and ruled that the defendant's actions had unfairly obstructed the claimant's freedom to operate on the market under section 4 No. 10 UWG. The court of appeal, the Higher Regional Court of Hamburg (case reference: 3 U 240/05 of 13 September 2007), dismissed the claim and held that FIFA could base its claim neither on its earlier trade mark registrations nor on the protection of ‘work titles’. The Higher Regional Court disagreed with the Court of First Instance and emphasized that it could not be established that the defendant's trade mark registration aimed to obstruct the claimant in the market. The defendant's trade mark registrations predominantly served to safeguard its established business practices. Even though the specifications of the defendant's trade marks were wider than its actual business activities, a certain level of expansion was permissible.

In its decision of 12 November 2009, the German Federal Supreme Court agreed with the Higher Regional Court's reasoning. The Federal judges found that there was no likelihood of confusion between the parties' trade marks under section 14, German Trade Mark Act; nor could FIFA successfully base its claim on the ‘work title rights’ it owned for ‘WM 2010’, ‘GERMANY 2006’, and ‘SOUTH AFRICA’. FIFA was also barred from making claims under unfair competition law, including the so-called ‘general clause’ of section 3 UWG.

The Federal Supreme Court based its decision on the following reasoning: Ferrero's trade marks did not influence the relevant trade circles to assume that it was an official sponsor of the World Cup tournaments, nor did the defendant unfairly block FIFA's efforts to market the World Cup events via licensing through third party sponsors. The court emphasized that FIFA's basic constitutional right to exploit its World Cup tournaments commercially did not extend to the point that it could prevent all types of third party exploitation of the sport event.

Practical significance

The Federal Supreme Court clarified that FIFA, as the organiser of the World Cup tournament, did not own the exclusive right to every kind of financial exploitation of the sporting events it organized. Neither Ferrero's trade mark registrations nor its practice of including collectible stickers with its confectionery products unfairly and uncompetitively affect FIFA's economic exploitation of the events or lead to confusion on the market.

However, while this decision could have far-reaching consequences for organisers of sport (and other events) that seek to financially exploit their respective events, it is unlikely to be last ‘match’ between both sides, who have been involved in various disputes before.

Anticipating something new in Germany

Authors: Christopher Hayes and Jens Toftelund Madsen (H Lundbeck A/S, Copenhagen, Denmark)

Eli Lilly & Co v (1) Egis Gyogysergya Rt; (2) Neolab Ltd and interveners (i) Stada Arzneimittel AG; (ii) ratiopharm GmbH; (iii) Hexal AG; (iv) Sandoz Pharmaceuticals GmbH. X ZR 89/047 December 16 2008

he Xth Senate of the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) has allowed an appeal against the decision of the 3rd Senate of the Federal Patent Court (Bundespatentgericht) which rendered Eli Lilly's patent for the pharmaceutical compound olanzapine null and void.

Legal context

The Bundespatentgericht (BPatG) had interpreted previous case law as having established the principle that a disclosure of a general chemical formula of a genus of chemical compounds is a disclosure of all members of that genus even where all members have not been expressly described. Therefore, if the compound could be made without effort, such a disclosure was novelty-destroying. In overturning the first instance decision, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) restated the principles of novelty in German patent law, bringing them firmly back into line with the jurisprudence of the European Patent Office (EPO) and its contracting member states.

The following key points should be noted:

* The BGH has overruled previous case law regarding novelty and anticipation.
* With regard to chemical compounds, for a publication to be a novelty-destroying anticipation it must clearly and expressly disclose the compound in question.
* This decision incorporates the EPO's ‘photographic’ approach to novelty into German patent law.
* This decision harmonizes the EPO's approach with Germany and demonstrates the uniformity of outcome when applied in Germany and the UK.

Facts

Eli Lilly is the proprietor of European Patent 454,436, which claims the chemical compound the generic name of which is olanzapine, a schizophrenia treatment marketed by Eli Lilly under the brand name Zyprexa®. Using the problem-solution approach, the problem is defined as obtaining an antipsychotic medication with a reduced propensity for extra-pyramidal side effects; olanzapine was the solution to this problem in the patent in suit.

Analysis

First instance decision

The validity of the olanzapine patent was successfully challenged before the Bundespatentgericht (BPatG, 4 June 3Ni21/04 (EU)). The BPatG accepted that the patent in suit was anticipated by the prior publication of a scientific paper by Chakrabati.

Chakrabati contained a general chemical formula, akin to a so-called Markush formula, and which contained olanzapine. There was no express disclosure of olanzapine by Chakrabati, nor was there an indication that the authors had made or tested olanzapine in their scientific model.

In reaching its decision, the BPatG applied earlier decisions of the BGH, notably Fluoran (BGHZ 103, 150) and Elektrische Steckverbindung (Electrical Plug Connection) (BGHZ 128, 270 Elektrische Steckverbindung), to reach the conclusion that Chakrabati was a novelty-destroying disclosure. This was because a person skilled in the art starting from the general formula could work out each compound contained within the formula and therefore could conceptualize olanzapine.

The BPatG went further: based on Chakrabati, it would have been obvious for the person skilled in the art to make olanzapine. There were methods disclosed in Chakrabati which could have been used to deliver olanzapine to the person skilled in the art. In effect, the BPatG's reasoning was that a person skilled in the art could fill in the gaps in Chakrabati from the specific compounds and methods disclosed in the publication to produce olanzapine. The same logic was applied to a number of prior art publications which also disclosed Markush formulae, which were even broader in scope than Chakrabati. The BPatG therefore held that these were also novel-destroying anticipations.

Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof on novelty

The BGH looked at the alleged Chakrabati anticipation in detail. In Chakrabati, several compounds of the genus were expressly described, although olanzapine itself was not. The BPatG held that the skilled reader would be able to fill in the missing pieces from Chakrabati using his own technical knowledge would therefore be led to olanzapine.

The BGH stated that in determining whether a publication was novelty-destroying, the Court should not undertake a process whereby the skilled addressee's technical knowledge could be used to work the invention. Rather, it must determine what is ‘directly and clearly’ derived from the publication.

At paragraph 26, the BGH explains this, pointing out that it is acceptable to read the claims and specification and to include those pieces of knowledge so plainly evident to the skilled reader or absolutely necessary to make the invention work, should not be construed as supplementing the requirements for anticipation. Indeed, the BGH states that Electrical Plug Connection lays down the principle that the modifications were so obvious to the skilled reader that he reads the publication essentially almost along with his own thoughts, even if he is unaware that he is doing this. Therefore, for the purposes of determining whether an anticipation is detrimental to novelty, it is not permissible to supplement the publication further.

The BGH then turned to Fluoran, which the lower Court had interpreted as stating a principle that, in a genus patent, all members of that genus are disclosed, whether expressly described or not. This, the BGH held, was not a correct statement of the law. Further, in distinguishing Fluoran, the BGH noted at paragraph 28 that Fluoran was issued under the 1968 Patent Act, the appeal being only on a point of law, and the Senate held that it was bound by the factual findings of the BPatG. In summary, the deciding factor was whether there was a concrete disclosure of the specific compound.

Simply because someone of skill had the ability to make a greater or lesser number of the compounds disclosed by a general formula did not, for the purposes of the evaluation of novelty, equate to a specific disclosure of all compounds covered by the general formula. To be considered a valid anticipation, the specific compound must be disclosed. To the extent that the Fluoran case purported to lay down a different principle, the BGH stated that this did not represent the law of novelty in German patent law.

Applying this reasoning also to UK patent 1,533,235, which did not expressly describe olanzapine, the BGH held that this patent, or patents derived from this priority application, nor the publication by Schauza & Mager did not constitute a specific disclosure of olanzapine, and hence could not form a novelty-destroying anticipation.

Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof on inventive step

A further publication by Chakrabati (Schauza & Mager Pharmazie (1983) 38) also describes a structure–activity relationship analysis of various compounds, in order to aid in the development of an antipsychotic with a lower propensity for extrapyramidal side effects. Some compounds showed promise under this paradigm, and warranted further study. Since olanzapine was not one of the compounds reported, there was nothing presented in Chakrabati that would make the choice of olanzapine an obvious choice for further analysis.

While acknowledging that the subgroup of compounds to which olanzapine belonged appeared to have the greater potential for further development, the BGH stated that this was not in and of itself obvious to the skilled reader, who would not discount other subgroups of compounds for further testing from the outset without testing them further.

The choice of synthesizing this subgroup of compounds would have been obvious to a person skilled in the art only if he had a reason to synthesize them in the first place. No such rationale was held to be provided in the prior art. The validity of the inventive step contained within the patent in suit was therefore also upheld.

Harmonisation with EPO law

In reaching its decision, the BGH has importantly stated that there is no divergence between German national and EPO jurisprudence on this point regarding novelty in patent law. At paragraph 29, the BGH states that the jurisprudence of the German courts is aligned with that of the EPO and that, according to EPO case law, a ‘photographic’ disclosure is required to be potentially novelty-destroying.

Comparison with the UK olanzapine decision

In the corresponding UK case on olanzapine (Dr Reddy's Laboratories (UK) Ltd v Eli Lilly & Company Ltd [2008] EWHC 2345 (Pat)), Floyd J reached the same conclusion regarding novelty and inventive step, upholding the validity of the olanzapine patent. At paragraph 29, the BGH made reference to the analogous litigation in the UK, stating that the German law of novelty was in line with the EPO jurisprudence and that the EPO approach was also being implemented in the UK. Using this harmonized approach, the BGH and the High Court in the UK reached the same conclusion regarding this patent, with both courts citing the same EPO decisions as the foundation for their reasoning.

Practical significance

As a result of the strict interpretation and application of Fluoran in Germany, the German patent courts had been viewed by innovator companies as being quite anti-patent and markedly divergent from the jurisprudence of the EPO regarding novelty of chemical compounds. This decision of the highest national court in Germany restates the law of novelty in German patent law.

This decision brings the determination of novelty under German case law firmly into line with the EPO, and with contracting member states such as the UK. From the point of view of innovator companies (and their competitors), this decision brings clarity and certainty that compounds previously disclosed in a Markush formula will be viewed in the same way in Germany as in other EPO member states. Thus, the novelty of such compounds is not destroyed by the mere disclosure of the Markush formula in an earlier publication.

While there will invariably be the occasional debate within society as to where the threshold for novelty should be set for patentable inventions, it should be accepted that, wherever this level is placed, it is desirable that it be consistent. Different jurisdictions should not have different novelty requirements; particularly if they are contracting states to the European Patent Convention, since national laws should be interpreted in an analogous manner.

At first glance, the main consequence of this decision appears to lower the bar for novelty in Germany, which will be welcomed by innovator companies. The significance of this decision has much wider ramifications. As noted above, this decision brings this aspect of German patent law into harmony with the EPO, and the jurisprudence of other contracting member states.

Regardless of where along the spectrum the threshold for novelty is set, it should be consistently applied both within the jurisdiction and across jurisdictions, particularly as the vast majority of patent litigation is multi-jurisdictional in nature. This decision therefore should be welcomed as it brings clarity and certainty with regard to patents for chemical compounds previously disclosed in a Markush formula or contained within a general chemical formula.